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Abstract
A salient feature of the recent recession is that regions that have experienced the largest changes in
household leverage have also experienced the largest declines in output and employment. We study a
cash-in-advance economy in which home equity borrowing, alongside public money, is used to conduct
transactions. Declines in home prices tighten the cash-in-advance constraint, triggering recessions. We
parameterize the model to match the key cross-sectional features of the data. The model implies that
real activity is very sensitive to liquidity shocks, but not to credit shocks, and that monetary policy can
significantly reduce the severity of credit-driven recessions.
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A striking feature of the recent recession is that regions of the U.S. (states or counties) that have expe-
rienced the largest swings in household borrowing have also experienced the largest declines in employment
and output. Figure 1 illustrates this feature of the data, by plotting the change in employment during the
credit crunch (2007-2009) against the change in household debt-to-income ratios during the preceding boom
(2001-2007, left panel) and the contemporaneous bust (right panel).1
Figure 1: Leveraging, Deleveraging, and Employment across U.S. States
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This pattern in the data is at odds with the predictions of standard models of financing frictions. In standard
models, a tightening of borrowing constraints leads households to reduce their leverage not only by reducing
consumption but also by increasing their labor supply. Hence, the stronger the need to de-lever, the larger the
increase in labor supply.2 Standard models therefore predict a relationship between leverage and employment
that is the opposite of that observed in both panels of Figure 1. Non-standard preferences that attenuate
wealth effects can mute the counter factual responses of output and employment, but cannot, on their own,
reproduce the striking correlation between household debt and employment in the data.
Our goal in this paper is to quantitatively evaluate a theory that can account for the evidence in Figure 1,
as well as other important cross-sectional features of the recent U.S. recession. We parameterize the theory
to allow it to account for the salient features of the dynamics of leverage and employment in a cross-section
of U.S. states and study the aggregate response of our model economy to credit shocks. In doing so we argue
that it is important to distinguish between liquidity constraints and credit constraints: while a liquidity
1The red lines in Figure 1 are not regression lines, they represented the predicted values from our calibrated model. Data
sources are described in the Appendix.
2See Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005). The small open economy “Sudden Stop” literature (see, e.g. Mendoza (2010))
addresses this issue by postulating that the tightening of credit reduces the firms’ ability to finance working capital. We discuss
these issues below.
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crunch in our model can indeed reproduce the relationship between leverage and employment observed in
the data, a credit crunch alone cannot.
Our benchmark model focuses solely on the role of liquidity constraints. The model we study is a cash-
in-advance economy with a continuum of islands that trade with each other. Each island produces tradable
and non-tradable goods subject to a constant-returns technology. Tradable goods produced on different
islands are imperfectly substitutable. Our key departure from standard cash-in-advance models is that, in
addition to public (government-issued) money, households can draw down a line of credit, which we refer
to as home equity borrowing, in order to conduct transactions in the goods market. The amount of home
equity borrowing is limited by a collateral constraint: households can only borrow up to a fraction, θ, of the
value of their home.
These assumptions have two important consequences. First, homes provide liquidity services in addition
to housing services. The liquidity services depend on the price of homes relative to consumption goods,
the shadow value of liquidity, and the value of the collateral constraint, θ. Home prices therefore depend
on current and expected values of θ. Second, home prices affect the amount of nominal balances that can
be used to finance consumption expenditures. From a monetary perspective, an increase in real estate
wealth effectively increases the velocity of money. This is the channel through which our model generates
business cycles from nominal credit shocks. A decline in borrowing tightens the cash-in-advance constraint
and amplifies the transactions frictions, thus leading to a recession. Absent the cash-in-advance constraint
such a decline would involve no real transfers of resources from one island to another and would have no
effect on real activity.
In addition to the cash-in-advance and liquidity constraints, we introduce two frictions that allow our
model to account for the pattern of the data presented in Figure 1. First, nominal wage rigidities translate
the decline of nominal consumption expenditures into real consumption spending. Second, we introduce
frictions that prevent the immediate re-allocation of labor from the non-tradable to the tradable goods
sector. Without this friction a negative credit shock leads to an expansion of the tradable sector which
quickly undoes the effect of the credit tightening by increasing the inflow of public money from other islands.
In our model, three parameters determine the aggregate and cross-sectional responses to the large swings
in housing wealth observed in the data. The first two parameters are the degree of wage stickiness and the
degree of labor mobility. As discussed above, both of these frictions amplify the response of employment to
a decline in home equity borrowing. We therefore pin down the size of these parameters by requiring that
the model reproduces the relationship between measures of real activity across U.S. states (construction and
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non-construction employment) and measures of household leverage.
The third key parameter, θ, determines the fraction of consumption expenditures that were financed out
of home equity borrowing during the upturn preceding the recession. To pin down the size of this parameter,
we turn to the evidence from Mian and Sufi (2010a). These researchers argue that borrowing against the
value of one’s home accounts for a significant fraction of the rise in U.S. household leverage from 2002 to
2006. They use household-level data for a sample of 74,000 homeowners in different geographic regions of
the U.S. and instrument house price growth using proxies for housing supply elasticities at the MSA level.
In doing so they find that a 1$ increase in house prices causes a $0.25 increase in home equity debt. We
use their findings to pin down the third key parameter in our model. To give a sense of the magnitude of
this parameter, our calibration implies a marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth of 6.6 cents
on the dollar. This number is in line with existing empirical estimates that range from 5 to 13 cents on the
dollar (see Li and Yao (2007) and Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2011) for comprehensive discussions).3
We show that the model does a very good job at accounting for the cross-sectional features of the data,
and in particular the correlation between changes in measures of real activity during the bust and the
change in household leverage in the boom. In addition to matching the relationship between employment
and household leverage (by construction), the model also does a good job at reproducing statistics in the
data that were not explicitly targeted in our calibration. The model predicts an elasticity of consumption
spending to leverage of -22% (-24% in the data), of non-durable consumption spending to leverage of -68%
(-69% in the data), and an elasticity of house prices to leverage of 86% (106% in the data). Moreover, the
model’s fit does not come at the expense of assuming an unrealistic degree of wage stickiness. While in the
model wages are actually somewhat sensitive to changes in household leverage (an elasticity of -5%), in the
data there is essentially no relationship between wages and changes in household leverage across states.
We use the model to study its predictions about the effect of the credit boom of 2001-2007 (a 50% increase
in the debt-to-income ratio) and subsequent bust on measure of aggregate economic activity. We study two
experiments. In the first experiment, we assume that monetary policy expands the Fed’s balance sheet by
7% of GDP, in line with the Fed’s actions in the data. We find that under this path for policy the model’s
predictions match remarkably well the pattern in the data. The model predicts a decline of non-construction
employment of 5.5% (5.3% in the data), non-durable consumption of 3.8% (2.7%) in the data and durable
3The marginal propensity is heterogeneous and depends on household characteristics. Li and Yao (2007), for instance,
emphasize important life-cycle effects. Our simple model does not capture these features of the data. Another potential concern
is that the responses to increases and decreases in housing wealth might be different. Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2011), however,
find roughly symmetrical effects.
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consumption of 13% (14% in the data). As in the data, the response of durable consumption is a lot more
severe due to the much stronger inter-temporal substitution for durables.
In the second experiment we assume away the Fed intervention. Absent the monetary expansion, the
model predicts an 8.7% drop in non-construction employment (5.3% in the data), a 7.3% drop in non-durable
consumption (2.7% in the data), and a 20% decline in durable goods spending. The model thus over-predicts
the decline in real activity observed in the data and suggests that absent the Fed intervention the employment
and consumption declines would have been more than 50% larger.
Our final contribution is to extend our analysis to study the role credit constraints in addition to liquidity
constraints. Distinguishing between the two types of constraints is important in light of work by Johnson,
Parker, and Souleles (2006), Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2011) and Kaplan and Violante
(2011) who document empirically that a large fraction of wealthy households – households who are net
savers – are nonetheless liquidity constrained.4
To introduce a non-trivial credit market we assume that there are two types of households who differ in
their rates of time-preference. The proportion of impatient household is the same in each island, and each
household can trade a risk-free security in an economy-wide asset market. The amount the household can
borrow in this market is restricted by a collateral constraint. We refer to this constraint as the credit con-
straint. To distinguish between the credit and liquidity constraints, we assume that markets are segmented:
transferring funds from one market to another entails a one-period delay. The household’s balances available
for consumption in the goods market are therefore its holdings of (publicly issued) money, as well as the
amount it borrows via home equity lines of credit. The cash-in-advance frictions we impose in the goods
market implies that, although only impatient households are credit-constrained, both types of households are
liquidity-constrained. For this reason shocks to the liquidity constraint have important real effects on output
and employment in our setup, whereas credit shocks essentially wash out in the aggregate. The extended
model validates our initial approach: We show that the dynamic responses to a liquidity shock in this setup
are essentially the same, both in the aggregate and at the island level, as the responses in our parsimonious
cash-in-advance economy.
Relation to the literature
Our paper is related to four lines of research: (i) macroeconomic models with credit frictions, (ii) monetary
4Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) find that, in 2001, “households spent 20 to 40 percent of their rebates on non durable
goods during the three-month period in which their rebates arrived, and roughly two-thirds of their rebates cumulatively during
this period and the subsequent three-month period.” Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2011) find that, in 2008,
“households spent about 12-30% of their stimulus payments on non- durable expenditures during the three-month period in
which the payments were received,” and that “there was also a substantial and significant increase in spending on durable goods,
in particular vehicles, bringing the average total spending response to about 50-90% of the payments.”
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economics, (iii) real estate wealth; (iv) determinants of consumer spending. We discuss the connections of our
paper to each topic. Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), most macroeconomic papers introduce credit
constraints at the entrepreneur level (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)).
In all these models, the availability of credit limits corporate investment. As a result, credit constraints affect
the economy by affecting the size of the capital stock. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) study a model where
shocks that hit the financial intermediation sector lead to tighter borrowing constraints for entrepreneurs.
We model shocks in a similar way. The difference is that our borrowers are households, not entrepreneurs,
and, we argue, this makes a difference for the model’s cross-sectional implications. Models that emphasize
firm-level frictions cannot reproduce the strong correlation between household-leverage and employment at
the micro-level, unless the banking sector is island-specific, as in the small open economy “Sudden Stop”
literature (Mendoza (2010)). This “local lending channel” does not appear to be operative across U.S. states,
however, presumably because business lending is not very localized.5
On the monetary side, we follow the cash-in-advance literature of Lucas (1980) and Lucas and Stokey
(1987). We introduce home equity borrowing and show that velocity becomes a function of home prices. In
the model, stricter lending standards lead to a drop in real estate value, which decreases the spending power
of consumers. In terms of classical monetary economics our model interprets the recession as a large drop
in velocity. We also study monetary responses to the crisis, and in particular non-standard interventions as
in Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Curdia and Woodford (2009).
Our paper is related to the literature on housing wealth and consumption. Like Iacoviello (2005) we
study a model where housing wealth can be used as collateral for loans. In his model, these are loans to
entrepreneurs, while in our model, these are loans to households. Moreover, as emphasized above, the role
of credit in our model is to facilitate transactions, not to smooth consumption inter-temporally. Lustig
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) show that the collateral value of housing plays an important role in shaping
asset returns because a decline in house prices undermines risk sharing and increases the market price of
risk. Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) emphasize the role of time-varying risk premia
in the recent increase and declines in housing prices. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) emphasize
heterogeneous expectations about long-run fundamentals and "social dynamics." Compared to these papers,
our paper is less concerned with the exact source of house price movements, but rather with their their
effects on real activity in the aggregate and in the cross-section. An important mechanism in our model
5For instance, Mian and Sufi (2010b) find that the predictive power of household borrowing remains the same in counties
dominated by national banks. It is also well known that businesses entered the recession with historically strong balanced sheets
and were able to draw on existing credit lines (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2008).
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is the feedback from lending standards to house prices. Landvoigt, Piazzesi, and Schneider (2010) provide
evidence consistent with this feedback in a detailed analysis of the housing market of San-Diego. They find
that easier access to credit for poor households leads to higher house prices at the low end of the housing
market.
Most closely connected to our paper is the work of Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2010) and Eggertsson and
Krugman (2011) who also study the responses of an economy to a household-level credit crunch. These
researchers find, as we do, that a credit crunch has a minor effect on employment if the economy is away
from the zero lower bound. In both of these studies a credit crunch generates a decline in employment
essentially because of the zero lower bound constraint. Unlike these researchers, we focus on the effect of a
liquidity, rather than credit crunch and show that the former can have a sizable effect on real activity even
away from the zero lower bound. Moreover, our focus is on understanding the cross-sectional evidence, in
addition to the aggregate responses.
The view that a liquidity crunch can exacerbate transaction frictions is, of course, not novel to our
paper. For example, Lucas and Stokey (2011) have argued that a liquidity crisis “has the effect of reducing
the supply available to carry out the normal flow of transactions, leading to a reduction in production and
employment.” Our goal in this paper is to evaluate this mechanism using cross-sectional evidence and study
its implications for aggregate dynamics.
Methodologically, we share our emphasis on cross-sectional information with Nakamura and Steinsson
(2011). They study the effect of military procurement spending across U.S. regions, and they also emphasize
the role of nominal rigidities and the power of cross-sectional evidence for identifying key model parameters.
In both models differences in island-level employment dynamics are unaffected by aggregate-level shocks
which are difficult to isolate: for example productivity shocks, changes in monetary policy, or foreign capital
flows.6 As a result, both our and their paper argue, cross-sectional statistics impose sharp restrictions on
the set of parameter values that allow the model to match the data.
In Section 1 we present the model and we define the equilibrium. In Section 2 we study the qualitative
and theoretical properties of the model in simplified setup. In Section 3 we propose a quantitative calibration
and we study the response of the economy to various shocks. Section 4 presents the results of our simulation
of the boom and bust from 2001 to 2009. Section 6 extends the model and compares liquidity constraints
6It is worth emphasizing that these shocks would create important issues in interpreting aggregate data. For instance,
Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) show that foreign inflows can have a significant impact on aggregate house
price dynamics. Similarly, calibrating the model’s parameters using only with aggregate data would require to take a stand on
controversial issues of monetary policy (Taylor, 2011).
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with credit constraints. Section 7 concludes.
1 Model
We study a closed economy with a continuum of islands that trade with each other. Each island produces
tradable and non-tradable goods and is populated by a representative household. Means of payment are
provided by the government and by private lenders (banks and shadow banks).
Our model can be interpreted as a large country with a collection of regions (e.g., USA), or a monetary
union with a collection of states (e.g., EU). The key assumption are that these regions share a common
currency, and that agents live and work in only one region.
1.1 Households
The household’s preferences are given by:
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
c¯i,t, d¯i,t, hi,t, l¯i,t
)
where c¯i,t denotes non durable consumption, d¯i,t and hi,t are the stocks of durable goods and housing owned
by the household, and l¯i,t is an index of labor supplied. We motivate the demand for money with a constraint
à la Clower (1967). An important feature of our model is that households have two sources of liquidity: cash
and private credit. We assume that credit is collateralized by housing wealth while cash is not.
As in all cash-in-advance models, we must specify the timing of trades within a period. We follow the
timing proposed by Lucas (1980).7 Each period is divided into three stages. Money and banking markets
open first. Households bring in pre-existing cash balances Xi,t−1 and obtain a credit line from private
lenders, while the government engages in open market operations. We call Mit the government-issued cash
in the hands of consumers after the open markets operations at time t, and Bit the amount of private credit
available. In the second stage, each household splits into a worker and a shopper. The shopper can spend
no more than Mi,t +Bi,t, while the worker supplies her labor. In the last stage of the period, the household
receives its labor income and the profits distributed by the firms, repays the private lenders and carries over
Xi,t units of currency to the next period. Notice that that Bi,t is within-period credit. The timing of the
7Sargent and Smith (2009) discuss the importance of the timing of tax collection. This issue does not matter when we
perform our cross-sectional analysis since we set taxes to zero. It can matter, however, when we consider various monetary
policy responses in the last section of the paper. See also Lucas and Stokey (1987).
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model is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Timing of Households’ Cash and Credit Flows
Financial Trading Shopping & Production Payment Collection
Cash Mi,t = Xi,t−1 + Ti,t Mi,t Xi,t
Credit 0 Bi,t − (1 + r)Bi,t
Spending 0 P¯i,tc¯i,t +Qi,tyhi,t + V¯i,te¯i,t 0
Income Ti,t 0 Πi,t +Wi,t · li,t
Let Qi,t be the price of houses on island i at time t, and let yhi,t = hi,t − (1− δh)hi,t−1 denote the purchase
of housing. Similarly, let V¯i,t denote the price index for durable goods and P¯i,t denote the price index for
non-durable consumption. Let e¯i,t = d¯i,t − (1− δd) d¯i,t−1 denote purchases of durable goods. The consumer
spends his balances on non-durables, durables and housing, subject to the cash & credit in advance constraint:
P¯i,tc¯i,t +Qi,ty
h
i,t + V¯i,te¯i,t ≤Mi,t +Bi,t, (1)
Equation (1) says that firms accept to sell goods in exchange for bills printed by the government as well as
units of credit backed by banks.8 We assume that private credit for consumption must be collateralized by
housing wealth. The amount of private credit is subject to the collateral constraint:
Bi,t ≤ θi,tQi,thi,t. (2)
The parameter θi,t is exogenous, potentially island-specific, and the only source of shocks in this economy.
The household supplies three types of labor: to the non-tradable, tradable, and housing sectors. Each is
industry-specific and aggregates into a final composite labor supply as:
l¯i,t =
[
ατ
(
lτi,t
)φ
+ αn
(
lni,t
)φ
+ αh
(
lhi,t
)φ] 1φ
(3)
where φ ≥ 1 is a parameter that governs how substitutable different types of labor are and determines
the degree to which labor can be reallocated across sectors. If φ = 1, we have the model with perfect
substitutability (mobility) across sectors, while as φ tends to ∞, the total amount of labor supplied is the
8An equivalent interpretation of (1) is that houses are purchased with credit, and goods with both cash Mit and left-over
credit Bit −Qi,tyhi,t.
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maximum of what is supplied in each sector.
Since labor is sector-specific, wages differ across sectors. Let Wi,t denote the vector of nominal wages in
each sector and let Πi,t be the profits paid by private firms. At the end of the period, the liquidity position
of the household is therefore: Xi,t = Πi,t + Wi,t · li,t + Mi,t − P¯i,tc¯i,t − Qi,tyhi,t − V¯i,te¯i,t − rBit. Finally,
government implements monetary policy by printing new bills at the beginning of time t, and distributing
them across islands: Mi,t+1 = Xi,t + Ti,t+1. The flow budget constraint of the consumer is therefore
Mi,t+1 = Πi,t +Wi,t · li,t +Mi,t − P¯i,tc¯i,t −Qi,tyhi,t − V¯i,te¯i,t − rBit + Ti,t+1. (4)
The total amount printed by the government is simply Tt+1 =
´
Ti,t+1. In the remaining of the paper, we
use the following specification for the utility function:
u
(
c¯i,t, d¯i,t, hi,t, l¯i,t
)
= log c¯i,t + ξ log d¯i,t + η log hi,t −
l¯
1+ 1ν
i,t
1 + 1ν
.
1.2 Credit
Let Bi,t be the amount of credit provided by banks. Consumers use this credit, together with their holdings
of public money, to purchase goods from firms. As in the search theory of money (see Lagos (2010) for
a discussion and references), the idea is that consumers are anonymous to firms, but not to banks. Firms
therefore cannot trust consumers to repay but they can go after the banks. Banks can keep track of consumers
and seize a fraction θi,t of the collateral in case of default.
At the end of the period, the consumer repays (1 + r)Bt to the bank, and the bank pays Bt to the firm,
thus making a profit equal to ΠBt = rBt. We assume free entry in the banking sector, thus in equilibrium
we have r = 0.9 Finally, we assume that β and θi,t are low enough for the constraints (1) and (2) to bind in
all islands at all times.
9Also recall that B is within-period credit, i.e. credit flowing from workers to shoppers subject to the cash-advance-constraint.
In that sense, B is really private money. The distinction between multi-period credit and within-period credit is not important
as long as there are no dead weight losses from default. Analyzing costly defaults is important but clearly beyond the scope of
this paper. In our calibration, we assume that home equity loans have a maturity of 5 years and we use the correct accounting
to translate stocks into flows.
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1.3 Wages
So far we have described the program of households as if there were no frictions in the labor market. In the
quantitative experiments below we assume that wages are sticky.10 The wage in sector k in island i at time
t is given by
W ki,t =
(
W ki,t−1
)λ (
W k∗i,t
)1−λ
(5)
where W k∗i,t is the the frictionless nominal wage, implicitly defined by the labor-leisure choice:
βEt
[
uc¯,it+1
P¯i,t+1
]
W k∗i,t = −ulk,it.
The parameter λ measures the degree of nominal rigidity. When λ = 1 wages are fixed, and when λ = 0
wages are fully flexible. Given the assumptions we have made on preferences, we can write the frictionless
wage as:
W k∗i,t = αk
(
l¯i,t
) 1
ν
(
lki,t
l¯i,t
)φ−1(
βEt
[
1
P¯i,t+1c¯i,t+1
])−1
. (6)
Our specification of wage rigidities is thus that of a partial-adjustment model in which a fraction 1 − λ of
the gap between the actual and desired wage is closed every period. Note that an alternative would be to
explicitly model households as being represented by unions who face a constant hazard of resetting their
wages, as in the Calvo model. Since we study the effect of permanent shocks, our conjecture is that this
alternative specification, though more notationally burdensome, would produce very similar results. Notice
finally that a higher φ makes it costlier for sectoral labor to adjust, by increasing the disutility for work and
therefore the sectoral wage.
1.4 Housing
We next discuss the housing market. Let µi,t be the multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint. The
housing Euler equation is:
η
hi,t
+ µi,tθi,tQi,t =
Qi,t
P¯i,tc¯i,t
− β (1− δh)Et
[
Qi,t+1
P¯i,t+1c¯i,t+1
]
(7)
10What matters for our cross-sectional result is the stickiness of relative wages across islands. Our interpretation of rigidities
as being nominal – denominated in currency common to all islands and controlled by a central bank – only matters in the last
part of the paper when we analyze counter-factual monetary experiments.
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This equation is intuitive. Without the second term on the LHS, it would be a standard durable demand
equation. ηhi,t is the marginal benefit of one extra unit of housing, and the RHS is the user cost. In our
model, however, houses also provide liquidity services. The value of these services is µi,t and each unit of
housing provides θi,tQi,t units of liquidity. Note that, using the consumption Euler equation we have that
the shadow value of liquidity is µi,t = 1P¯i,tc¯i,t − βEt
1
P¯i,t+1c¯i,t+1
.
There is a housing construction sector on each island. Firms on each island can produce new houses
using a decreasing return technology
yhi,t =
(
lhi,t
)χ
, (8)
where χ determines the degree of decreasing returns. We allow decreasing returns in order to capture the
role of land as a fixed factor in housing production. The aggregate stock of houses evolves according to:
hi,t = (1− δ)hi,t−1 + yhi,t (9)
Since the price of new housing goods is Qi,t, profit maximization by construction firms implies
Whi,t = χQi,t
(
lhi,t
)χ−1
(10)
Profits of construction firms are simply Πhi,t = (1− χ)Qi,tyhi,t, and we assume for simplicity that construction
firms are locally owned, so that Πhi,t is paid to the household of island i.
1.5 Non-Durable Consumption
Household’s consumption is an aggregate over the consumption of different varieties of tradable and non-
tradable goods. We assume that the aggregation function has a constant elasticity of substitution σ between
tradables and non tradables:
c¯i,t = [ω
1
σ
c
(
c¯τi,t
)σ−1
σ + (1− ωc)
1
σ
(
cni,t
)σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1 ,
where c¯τi,t is the consumption of the tradable good, cni,t is the consumption of the non-tradable good, and
ωc ∈ (0, 1) is the weight on tradables in the aggregator. The tradable good is itself an aggregate of the goods
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produced on different islands, with elasticity of substitution γ between goods produced on different islands:
c¯τi,t =
ˆ
j
cτi,t(j)
γ−1
γ

γ
γ−1
where j denotes the island where the good is produced. Let P¯ τt denote the price index for tradable goods. It is
common to all islands since we assume no trade costs, and it given by P¯ τt ≡
(´
i
(
P τi,t
)1−γ) 11−γ , where P τi,t de-
notes the price at which the tradables produced on island i are sold. Let Pni,t denote the price of non-tradable
goods in island i. The total consumption price index on island i is: P¯i,t ≡
[
ωc
(
P¯ τt
)1−σ
+ (1− ωc)
(
Pni,t
)1−σ] 11−σ .
Demand for non-tradables is:
cni,t = (1− ωc)
(
Pni,t
P¯i,t
)−σ
c¯i,t (11)
The demand on island i for tradables produced by island j is:
cτi,t(j) = ωc
(
P τj,t
P¯ τt
)−γ (
P¯ τt
P¯i,t
)−σ
c¯i,t (12)
1.6 Durables consumption
Investment in durables is also an aggregator over purchases of different varieties of tradable and non-tradable
goods. We assume that the aggregation function has the same constant elasticity of substitution σ between
tradables and non tradables as for consumption goods:
e¯i,t = [ω
1
σ
d
(
e¯τi,t
)σ−1
σ + (1− ωd)
1
σ
(
eni,t
)σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1 ,
where e¯τi,t are purchases of the tradable good to be used for investment, eni,t are purchases of the non-tradable
good to be used for investment, and ωd ∈ (0, 1) is the weight on tradables in the investment aggregator. The
tradable investment good is itself an aggregate of the goods produced on different islands, with elasticity of
substitution γ between goods produced on different islands:
e¯τi,t =
ˆ
j
eτi,t(j)
γ−1
γ

γ
γ−1
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where j denotes the island where the good is produced. Let V¯ τt denote the price index for tradable goods. This
price index is common to all islands since we assume no trade costs, and it given by V¯ τt ≡
(´
i
(
P τi,t
)1−γ) 11−γ
=
P¯ τt , where, recall, P τi,t denotes the price at which the tradables produced on island i are sold. Also recall
that Pni,t is the price of non-tradable goods in island i. The total investment price index on island i is:
V¯i,t ≡
[
ωd
(
P¯ τt
)1−σ
+ (1− ωd)
(
Pni,t
)1−σ] 11−σ . Notice the only reason the durable and non-durable indices
may differ is because of the differences in the weight of tradables in the two aggregators. Demand for
non-tradable goods used for investment is:
eni,t = (1− ωd)
(
Pni,t
V¯i,t
)−σ
e¯i,t (13)
The demand on island i for tradables produced by island j is:
eτi,t(j) = ωd
(
P τj,t
P¯ τt
)−γ (
P¯ τt
V¯i,t
)−σ
e¯i,t (14)
tradable and non-tradable. Finally, investment in durables satisfies the Euler equation
ξ
d¯i,t
=
V¯i,t
P¯i,tc¯i,t
− β(1− δd)Et
[
V¯i,t+1
P¯i,t+1c¯i,t+1
]
, (15)
and durable goods accumulate according to
d¯i,t = e¯i,t + (1− δd) d¯i,t−1 (16)
1.7 Production and Market Clearing
We assume perfect competition in both tradables and non-tradables, as well as the housing construction
sector. Each island is inhabited by a continuum of firms that produce a tradable good, and a continuum of
firms that produce a non-tradable good. We also assume that labor is the only factor and that production
is constant returns to scale:
yni,t = l
n
i,t and y
τ
i,t = l
τ
i,t (17)
Because of perfect competition the price of both tradable and non-tradable goods is equal to the nominal
marginal cost in each sector on the island: P τi,t = W τi,t, and similarly Pni,t = Wni,t. Tradable and non-tradable
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goods are used for consumption and investment. Market clearing therefore requires
yni,t = c
n
i,t + e
n
i,t, (18)
in the non tradable sector, and
yτi,t =
ˆ
j∈[0,1]
(
cτj,t(i) + e
τ
j,t(i)
)
, (19)
in the tradable sector.
1.8 Equilibrium
We assume exogenous shocks to the tightness of borrowing constraints θi,t. We will later discuss the inter-
pretation of these shocks. To complete the description of the economy, we need to specify the monetary and
fiscal policy. In equilibrium an island’s cash holdings evolve according to (4). The transfers {Ti,t}i,t and
money supplies {Mi,t}i,t must be consistent with the budget constraints of the government, and island-level
money holdings follow the process
Mi,t = Mi,t−1 + P τi,t−1y
τ
i,t−1 − P¯ τt−1
(
c¯τi,t−1 + e¯
τ
i,t−1
)
+ Ti,t. (20)
For most of our analysis we simply assume that the aggregate stock of currency remains constant, and we
normalize it to Mt = 1 and Ti,t = 0 for all i and t.11
An equilibrium is a collection of prices and allocations. Since the list is long, it is more convenient to
use some equilibrium conditions to limit the number of equilibrium objects. From the pricing conditions
P τi,t = W
τ
i,t and Pni,t = Wni,t, we can define the tradable price index P¯ τt and the island specific price indices
P¯i,t, V¯i,t, as a function of wages. Therefore we only need to include Qi,t,W τi,t,Wni,t,Whi,t, in the list of
equilibrium prices. Given these prices, real non durable expenditures c¯i,t determine local demand cni,t and
bilateral demands cτi,t (j) by (11) and (12). Similarly, real durable expenditures e¯i,t determine eni,t and eτi,t (j)
by (13) and (14). Labor inputs determine production in (8) and (17) and the labor index l¯i,t in (3). Finally,
the two stock variables hi,t, d¯i,t are simply pinned down by (9) and (16).
The equilibrium is thus defined by the four prices listed above and seven quantities: two for the credit
market Bi,t,Mi,t, three for the labor market lni,t, lτi,t, lhi,t, and two for the goods market c¯i,t, e¯i,t. The intuition
11Since in the aggregate we have
´ (
P τi,t−1y
τ
i,t−1 − P¯ τi,t−1
(
c¯τi,t−1 + e¯
τ
i,t−1
))
di = 0 by the resource constraint, we have´
Ti,t = Mt−Mt−1. Nothing pins down transfers to individual islands, however and we use the no transfer case as a benchmark.
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for how we pin down the equilibrium is as follows. The three labor supply equations in (5), together with
(6), pin down W τi,t,Wni,t,Whi,t. House prices Qi,t are pinned down by (7). (1), (2) pin down consumption c¯i,t
and borrowing Bi,t. (10), (19), (18) pin down lni,t, lτi,t, lhi,t. (15) pins down e¯i,t, and (20) pins down Mi,t.
2 Qualitative Properties of a Simplified Model
We now study a special case to build some intuition about the effect of credit shocks in our model economy.
In particular, we explain the difference between aggregate and island-level responses to credit shocks. To
do so we consider a model without construction (h = 1 given exogenously and δh = 0), with perfect labor
mobility across sectors (φ = 1), and without durable consumption (ξ = 0). Also, let ω = ωc denote the
weight on tradables in the consumption basket.
2.1 Nominal Credit and Velocity
Combining the CIA constraint (1) with the collateral constraint equation (2) we obtain a collateralized-
credit-in-advance (CCIA) constraint: P¯i,tc¯i,t = Mi,t + θi,tQi,thi,t. We define xi,t as nominal consumption
spending in island i at time t, xi,t ≡ P¯i,tc¯i,t, and qi,t as the housing wealth to spending ratio, qi,t ≡ Qi,thiP¯i,tc¯i,t .
Lemma 1. Nominal credit dynamics in the simplified model are characterized by the velocity equation
xi,t =
Mi,t
1− θi,tqi,t (21)
and the house price equation
η + βEt [qi,t+1] =
(
1− θi,t
(
1− βEt
[
xi,t
xi,t+1
]))
qi,t (22)
Equations (21) and (22) provide a lot of intuition for the model. Equation (21) combines the cash-in-
advance and collateral constraints, while equation (22) replaces equation (7). Given processes for Mi,t and
θi,t we could solve for xi,t and qi,t using (21) and (22). This is what we do in a one-island economy with
aggregate money supply Mt controlled by a central bank. Note that θi,tqi,t acts as a shock to velocity in
equation (21).
Across islands, however, Mi,t evolves endogenously, for two reasons. First the central bank does not
control the allocation of money across industries or locations within a country, and even less across countries
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in a monetary union. Second, islands accumulate or de-cumulate government money depending on the
private credit shocks that they experience. In particular, it would never be optimal for a government to reset
Mi,t = 1 at the beginning of each period. In our benchmark model, we set Tit = 0. Each island’s money
holdings are then an island-specific state variable.
The details of the equilibrium are in the appendix. We now explain the qualitative properties of the
economy’s response to liquidity shocks, first in the aggregate and then for the cross-section of islands.
2.2 Aggregate response: the one island model.
We first consider an economy without heterogeneity. In steady state, the resource constraint is: c¯ = l and the
labor-leisure condition implies c¯l1/ν = β. Therefore l = c¯ = (β)
ν
1+ν and the only steady state distortion is the
inter-temporal wedge introduced by the cash-in-advance constraint. Equation (22) implies q¯ = η(1−β)(1−θ) ,
and (21) implies x = M
1−θ¯q¯ , and the price level must be such that
M
P¯ c¯
= 1− θ¯q¯ (23)
The parameters must be such that θ¯q¯ < 1, or (1− β) (1− θ¯) > ηθ¯. In particular, β, η and θ must all be
small enough.
Lemma 2. Following a permanent tightening of the collateral constraint, aggregate nominal spending and
house prices are permanently lower. House prices drop by more than aggregate spending. The persistence of
the real effects following a permanent credit shock depends only on the degree of nominal rigidity and on the
elasticity of labor supply.
The key idea is that, given processes {Mt}t and {θt}t for aggregate money supply and credit tightness,
the system can be solved for {xt, qt}t using (21) and (22) without reference to the rest of the model, i.e.,
independently of technology, nominal rigidity, and labor supply preferences. After a permanent shock to
the borrowing constraint, if monetary policy is unchanged, the economy evolves along a path with constant
nominal spending. If the shock is positive, nominal spending jumps up and remains constant. We see that q
is increasing in θ: if credit is easier to obtain, housing value must increase relative to consumption spending
because the collateral dimension of housing services makes houses more valuable. Spending must go up
because of both θ and q. Going back to q, this means that housing prices must also increase so that even
though spending goes up, house prices increase more than spending. In the appendix we show that the
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persistence of the real effects following a permanent credit shock is given by λν1−λ+ν .
2.3 Cross-sectional responses
Consider an economy in which islands differ in the tightness of the borrowing constraint, θi. Two issues
arise at the island level. First, Mi,t is endogenous since islands can accumulate more or less public money.
Second, Wi,tli,t 6= P¯i,tc¯it since some goods are traded. Both of these issues are reflected in the money
accumulation equation: Mi,t+1 −Mi,t = Wi,tli,t − P¯i,tc¯i,t. Credit dynamics satisfy (22) and (20). The eight
equilibrium conditions have been described earlier. It is easy to check that the steady state allocations satisfy
li = c¯i = (β)
ν
1+ν = c¯. Since lni = (1− ω) c¯ and lτi = ωc¯, we always have l
n
i
lni +l
τ
i
= 1 − ω. All wages are the
same and Wi = P¯ . Therefore all xi are equal in all islands The following Lemma summarizes the steady
state prices and quantities
Lemma 3. In the steady state, all islands have the same real allocations, the same wages, prices and the
same nominal spending. Only house prices differ across islands. The aggregate price level solves
M
P¯ c¯
=
ˆ
i
(
1− ηθi
(1− β) (1− θi)
)
di. (24)
The CIA constraints determine the money balances Mi = (1− θiqi) P¯ c¯ that implement these allocations.
With constant x, we have qi = η(1−β)(1−θi) . In the aggregate, we must have,
´
Mi = M so the price level must
solve Equation (24) which is the generalization of (23) to an economy with heterogeneous nominal credit
supplies. The Lemma states that differences in θi across islands do not translate into differences in prices
or allocations. The reason is that islands with tighter constraints private credit accumulate public money.
Since money and private credit are perfect substitutes, both prices and allocations (with the exception of
house prices) are unaffected by the cross-sectional dispersion in θi.
Consider next the effect of an unanticipated, one-time shock to θi in any particular island. We calibrate
and solve the system numerically in Section 3, but much intuition can be gained by considering the special
case of fixed wages.
Lemma 4. In the cross section, permanent credit shocks have temporary consequences even when wages are
fully rigid.
The intuition is simple: nominal shocks cannot have permanent effects because money can flow across
islands. We present the details of the calculations in the Appendix. The key point is that house prices and
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nominal spending are linked by the following equation
qˆi,t = q˜i − axˆi,t,
where a is a constant that depends on the parameters of the model and q˜i measures the permanent impact of
the shock. The intuition comes from the model’s implications for aggregate dynamics and the steady state
cross section. In the aggregate, we know that permanent shocks to θ lead to constant values for x and q.
This is not going to be the case in the cross-section, so x will move, and q will be affected.
The persistence of shocks at the island level does not depend much on the degree of nominal rigidity.
This is in sharp contrast with the response of the aggregate economy. The reason is that islands that are
hard hit by the nominal credit shock accumulate money balances according to
Mi,t+1 −Mi,t = x¯
(
lˆi,t − xˆit
)
= −ωx¯xˆi,t.
This shows again the role of trade in smoothing the cross-sectional shocks.
2.4 Comparison of Time Series and Cross-Section
We finally compare the time-series and cross sectional responses of the economy to permanent shocks to
credit supply. In the aggregate we have q (θ) = η(1−β)(1−θ) and x (θ) =
M
1−θq . Therefore, on impact, we
have d ln q = θ¯
1−θ¯d ln θ and thus
∂ ln(x)
∂ ln(θ) =
θ¯q¯
(1−θ¯)(1−θ¯q¯) . Across islands, relative housing wealth evolves as
d ln qi,t = q˜i−axˆi,t. The permanent component, q˜i = θ¯1−θ¯ θˆi, is the same as in the aggregate case. Because of
the temporary component, however, the adjustment of relative housing wealth is gradual. Spending reacts
according to: ∂ ln(xi)∂ ln(θi) =
θ¯q¯
(1−θ¯)(1−(1−a)θ¯q¯) . The response of local spending to local credit is muted by a. For
employment, we have ∂ ln(li,0)∂ ln(xi,0) = 1− ω. We summarize the employment responses in Table 2.
Table 2: Elasticities with Fixed Wages and Permanent Credit Shocks
λ = 1, ρ = 1 Aggregate Across Islands
Spending to Credit ∂ ln(x)∂ ln(θ)
θ¯q¯
(1−θ¯)(1−θ¯q¯)
θ¯q¯
(1−θ¯)(1−(1−a)θ¯q¯)
Labor to Spending ∂ log(l)∂ log(x) 1 1− ω
Persistence Permanent Temporary
With fixed wages, spending is equal to real consumption. So Table 2 also shows that in the cross section,
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employment reacts by a fraction ω less than consumption, while in the aggregate it responds by as much as
consumption does.
We summarize our results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Positive Properties. Cross sectional responses to credit shocks are muted in three ways
relative to aggregate responses: (i) local spending reacts less to local credit because velocity effects are smaller;
(ii) employment is less sensitive to local spending because of trade; and (iii) the effects dissipate over time
because of endogenous adjustment in money balances.
The following figures illustrate the proposition. We report some impulse responses to further illustrate
the workings of the model. Figure 2 shows impulse responses to a 1% aggregate (common to all islands) drop
in θt in this economy12. W ∗ drops immediately while actual wages adjust more gradually due to nominal
rigidities. As a result consumption and employment drop. House prices drop because nominal spending
drops and because the drop in θt makes houses less useful in undoing the borrowing constraints. The drop
in B is therefore larger than the drop in θ and we have an amplification mechanism.
Figure 2: Aggregate Response to Permanent Credit Tightening
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Figure 3 reports similar responses to an island-specific shock, θi,t, assuming all other islands are at their
steady-state values. Consumption responds by more (-0.9% on impact) than employment does (-0.45% on
impact) because wages decrease in the island and hence demand for its tradables increases. From the results
of the previous section, we know that when shocks are permanent and wages rigid, the ratio of the response
12We report the parameter values used in this calculation in Table 3 below.
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of l to that of c is equal to 1−ω, which is 0.58 for our benchmark value of ω = 0.42. In the actual simulation,
the ratio is 0.51, which is close to 0.58 but, as expected, slightly smaller since wages do adjust.
Figure 3: Island Response to Permanent Credit Tightening
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Figure 4 illustrates why all series are less persistent in the cross-section than in the aggregate by showing
the evolution of nominal variables. The fact that consumption drops more than employment implies that
the island accumulates public money, M, immediately after the shock. This increase in M compensates the
decline in private credit, so that nominal spending reverts to the steady-state faster than in the aggregate.
2.5 Some Normative Implications
The focus of our paper is on the positive and quantitative properties of the model. However, in the interest
of building intuition, it is useful to state two simple normative propositions.
Figure 4: Island Monetary Response
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The first normative proposition is that, absent any frictions on monetary and fiscal policies, the govern-
ment can always maintain the steady state allocations by targeting nominal spending.
Proposition 2. Perfect Stabilization. Let x¯ be the steady state value of nominal spending (common to all
islands from Lemma 3). If the government adjusts its island-level transfers and its aggregate money supply
so that Mi,t = x¯ (1− θi,tqi,t), then real allocations remain at their steady state levels after any history of
credit shocks.
Proof. Only the path of nominal spending matters for real allocations in equations (5 29, 30, 31, 32, 33).
If xi,t = x¯ then
{
lni,t, l
τ
i,t,Wi,t,W
∗
i,t, P¯i,t, P¯
τ
t
}
all remain constant at their steady state values. Local house
prices are pinned down by 22, and Mi,t = x¯ (1− θi,tqi,t) ensures that xi,t = x¯. Finally, the implicit transfer
payments are given by (20).
In the one island case, the steady state implementation only requires open market operations to stabilize
aggregate nominal spending. With heterogeneity across islands, the implementation requires transfers across
islands, presumably involving fiscal authorities.
The second normative proposition concerns corrective taxes on labor income and home construction.
Before describing Pigouvian taxes, we note that the Friedman rule would be optimal in our economy without
island level shocks. By deflating at rate β the government could reduce the multiplier µt to zero and eliminate
all distortions in the economy. Our model is silent on the reasons that might make the Friedman rule
undesirable, or that might prevent its implementation. Instead, we simply assume that prices are constant
in steady state. This creates a wedge in the steady state labor supply. This can be corrected by a labor
income subsidy. Now imagine an economy similar to the one we have described, but with endogenous housing
supply, and let δh be the depreciation rate of houses. In order to understand the nature of optimal taxes,
we allow the government to use two separate instruments: a subsidy on labor income, and a specific tax on
home construction. We obtain the following results:
Proposition 3. Efficient Taxes and Home Construction. The steady state allocation with constant
money supply is efficient when labor income is subsidized at the rate β−1− 1 and home construction is taxed
at the rate θ(1−β)1−β(1−δh) .
Proof. See appendix.
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The subsidy β−1− 1 means that the steady state allocation of a model with exogenous housing would be
efficient. The key to understanding the proposition is to see that houses are used as a form of commodity
money. For the standard reasons identified in the monetary literature (Sargent and Wallace, 1983), when
we introduce a housing construction sector there is excessive production of commodity money, i.e., excessive
construction of new houses. The tax rate equals the liquidity services from housing θ times the steady state
value of money (the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint, or the opportunity cost of holding money,
which is 1−β). The denominator of the tax rate is simply an adjustment for the durability of housing (since
δh < 1).
3 Calibration
3.1 Complete model
If we combine the cash-in-advance constraint and the collateral constraint we now obtain P¯i,tc¯i,t +Qi,tyhi,t +
Vi,tei,t = Mi,t + θi,tQi,thi,t. Defining as in Section 2, xi,t ≡ P¯i,tc¯i,t and qi,t ≡ Qi,thi,txi,t , and the corresponding
ratio for durable goods vi,t =
Vi,tdi,t
xi,t
, we see that equation (21) becomes
xi,t
(
1−
(
θi,t −
yhi,t
hi,t
)
qi,t +
e¯i,t
di,t
vi,t
)
= Mi,t. (25)
The velocity interpretation still applies, but now we need to take into account housing construction and
spending of durable goods. We can write the house price equation (7) as
η + β (1− δh)Et
[
qi,t+1
hi,t
hi,t+1
]
=
(
1− θi,t
(
1− βEt
[
xi,t
xi,t+1
]))
qi,t.
Similarly, the Euler equation for durables is ξ + β(1 − δd)Et
[
vi,t+1
di,t
di,t+1
]
= vi,t. Trade and technology pin
down labor demands. Market clearing for non-tradable goods (18) becomes
lni,t =
(
(1− ω) P¯σ−1i,t + (1− ωd) vi,t
e¯i,t
di,t
V¯ σ−1i,t
)(
Wni,t
)−σ
xi,t,
and for tradable goods (19) becomes
lτi,t =
(
W τi,t
)−γ (
P¯ τt
)γ−σ ˆ
j
(
ωP¯σ−1j,t + ωdvj,t
e¯j,t
dj,t
V¯ σ−1j,t
)
xj,t.
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For convenience, the complete set of equilibrium conditions is provided in the Appendix.
3.2 Steady State and Static Parameters
We consider a steady state in which θi = θ is the same in all islands. We have two sets of parameters
in our model economy. The first set, referred to as static parameters, mostly determines the steady state
of our model economy. We choose these parameters to ensure that our model matches salient features of
the U.S. data. The second set of parameters, referred to as dynamic parameters, consists of (λ, φ, θ), the
parameters that govern the degree of nominal and real labor market rigidities, as well as the size of the
collateral constraint. These parameters mostly affect the dynamic responses of the model in response to
shocks. We pin down these parameter values by requiring that the model accounts for the cross-sectional
dynamics of debt, house prices, and employment in the data.
Here we briefly describe how we have chosen the static parameters of our model . We describe our choice
of the dynamic parameters in the next section, after we describe the cross-sectional experiments that we
conduct. Table 3 reports the parameter values we use and the moments of the data that pin down each
parameter.
We assume that a period is one year. For the borrowing constraints to bind in equilibrium, households
must be sufficiently impatient. We therefore set β = 0.95, at the lower end of the range of values (0.95−0.98)
used in the literature.
The ratio of residential investment spending to the housing stock is equal to 3.6% in the data. In the
steady state of our model we have that
yh
h
= δh = 0.036,
so this pins down the rate at which the housing stock depreciates, δh. The value of housing stock relative to
consumption expenditure, q, is equal to 2.11 in the data. In the steady state of our model we have that
q =
η
1− β (1− δh)− θ (1− β) ,
so we choose η accordingly.
In a similar fashion, δd pins down the ratio of spending on durables to their stock (equal to 0.27 in the
data) since
e
d
= δd = 0.27
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in our model. Moreover, the value of the durables relative to consumption expenditures, is equal to 0.5 in
the data and equal to
v =
ξ
1− β(1− δd)
in the steady-state of our model. We thus choose ξ to ensure our model matches the value of v in the data.
We normalize the stock of money,M, equal to 1. Since all nominal variables (including the price of houses,
Q) are proportional to M in the model, this is simply a convenient normalization that only determines the
price level in this economy. The CCIA constraint (25) therefore gives:
x =
M
1− (θ − δh) q + δdv =
1
1− (θ − δh) q + δdv
The parameters ατ and αn are not separately identified from ωc and ωd since we have assumed constant
returns to labor and both sets of weights simply pin down the share of each sector’s expenditure/labor. We
therefore normalize ατ and αn to ensure that wages are equal to unity in the two sectors in the steady-state:
Wn = W τ = 1. Given this normalization, goods prices are also equal to 1. We then choose αh to ensure that
lh = sh (l
τ + ln) , i.e. so that the steady-state share of labor in construction is sh that in the goods-producing
sectors. In the data, the ratio of labor in construction to 6.6% so we set the value of αh to hit this target.
Table 3: Parameters
Parameter Name Value Source/Target
Annual Discount Factor β 0.95
Home Value over Non Durable Spending q 2.11 Value in 2001. BEA, Flow of Funds
Home Depreciation Rate δh 0.036 Residential investment spending over housing stock
Labor Share Construction χ 0.6 Construction Wages over Residential Investment
Durable Stock Value over Non Durable Spending v¯ 0.5 Value in 2001. BEA, Flow of Funds
Durable Depreciation Rate δd 0.27 Spending on durables relative to durable stock
Employment Share of Construction sh 0.066 Value in 2001. BEA.
Trade weight in non durable consumption ωc 0.25 Trade literature. Distribution adjusted.
Trade weight in durable consumption ωd 0.6 Trade literature. Distribution adjusted.
Labor Supply Elasticity ν 2 Hall (2010)
Elasticity of substitution among traded goods γ 1.5 Trade literature
Elasticity of substitution traded/non traded σ 0.1 Own estimate
We calibrate the shares of tradable goods as in the international trade literature. We assume that the
distribution margin accounts for 40% of the retail price of the good. We assume that all durable goods are
tradable. Adjusting for local distribution, this gives ωd = 0.6. For non durable goods, we use the BEA data
on Personal Consumption Expenditure. We identify tradables with “goods” and non-tradables with “services
excl. housing”. The share of tradables shows a trend decline over time and is around 0.4 in 2002. Adjusting
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for distribution costs gives ωc = 0.25. Finally, we choose an elasticity of substitution between tradables
and non-tradables, σ, in order to match the comovement of the relative price of tradables to non-tradables
and the share of tradables in the data. In the data, there was a substantial decline in the relative price
of tradables and only a modest increase in real tradables consumption. A value of σ equal to 0.1 fits this
evidence best. It is more difficult to pin down the elasticity of substitution between tradables produced on
different islands, γ. In the international trade and macro literature, estimates of trade elasticities range from
0.5 to 4. We consider below a value equal to γ = 1.5, the typical value used in the international macro
literature. It turns out that the exact value of γ is not critical in our model as long as wages are sticky.
Finally, we follow Hall (2010) and set the labor supply elasticity, ν, equal to 2.
4 Quantitative Cross Sectional Experiments
We next describe the cross-sectional experiments we conduct, as well as our choice of the dynamic parameters,
λ, φ, θ, that allow our model to match the cross-sectional dynamics in the data. We describe the sources of
the cross-sectional and aggregate data we use in detail in the Appendix.
4.1 The Experiment
We study an experiment in which all islands start in the (identical) steady-state with the same credit
parameter, θ = θ¯, in 2001. From 2001 to 2007 each island experiences a gradual, equally-sized, island-
specific increase in θ. Finally, in 2008 and 2009 the collateral constraint in each island returns to θ¯ in two
equally-sized steps. Hence, as in the data, islands that experience the largest booms prior to 2007 also
experience the largest busts after 2007.
It turns out that changes in the current value of θ cannot replicate some important features of the cross
sectional dispersion that we observe. Specifically, the cross-sectional dispersion of home prices is too large to
be explained simply by the current value of θ. The basic issue is the following: θ drives both x and Q, but
with reasonable parameters, if the only shock is the current value of θ, the change in house prices cannot be
more than 1.5 times the change in nominal spending. This is not a severe constraint with aggregate data,
but it is not enough for the cross section. In the Appendix we describe one way to explain the cross-section:
news shocks to future values of θ. News shock can change q without changing the current value of θ. As a
result Q can move by more that 1.5 nominal income. All our results can be interpreted using this approach.
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This “news” interpretation is formally consistent with our model, but is really not crucial for our results.13
For the sake of simplicity, and since our goal is to study an experiment that accounts simultaneously for
the dynamics of credit and housing prices, we simply introduce a wedge in the housing Euler equation that
allows us to reproduce the behavior of house prices in the data. In particular, we now have
η + β (1− δh)Et
[
qi,t+1
hi,t
hi,t+1
]
=
(
1− θi,t
(
1− βEt
[
xi,t
xi,t+1
]))
qi,t + ωi,t
We choose the wedge ωi,t so that our model reproduces the response of house prices in the data from 2001
to 2007. As with the collateral parameter, each island experiences a gradual, equally-sized, island-specific
increase in Qi, the price of houses, from 2001 to 2007. In 2008 and 2009 house prices revert to the initial
steady-state in two equally-sized steps. We continue to assume a one-shock model so that θi and Qi are
perfectly correlated. In the news interpretation of the model this implies that current changes in θ are
perfectly correlated with expectations of further future increases in θ.
To map the model to the data, we will compute elasticities of island-level employment to island-level
changes in debt-to-income ratios. Changes in debt-to-income arise in the model from two sources: changes
in the collateral constraint, θ, and changes in house prices. It turns out that in our model the size of these
elasticities only depends on the relative size of the change in θ to that of changes in Q, not on the absolute
size of these changes, since the model is approximately linear. The relative size matters since changes in
house prices affect the returns to construction, and therefore the dynamics of employment, differently than
changes in the collateral requirement. The fact that the absolute size of such changes is irrelevant implies
that the elasticities we compute are unaffected by the standard deviation and higher order moments of the
distribution of changes in debt-to-income in the data.
To pin down the size of changes in θ and Q, we require that the model matches two key moments that
describe the credit boom reported in Table 4. The first moment is the average increase in the debt to income
ratio of 0.46. (from 0.86 to 1.32 in the cross-section of 12 states in Figure 1 for which data is available).
The second moment is the cross-sectional elasticity of house prices to leverage. To compute this moment,
we run a regression of the log-change in house prices, ∆ logQi, from 2001 to 2007 on the change in the
debt-to-income ratio, ∆Bi/Yi in this same period and find an elasticity equal to 0.86. Intuitively, the first
moment pins down the size of the credit boom (the increase in θ), while the second pins down the size of
13To be precise, what is crucial is to set up the experiment with the correct initial conditions, that is, the correct distribution
of B/Y and Q/Y. How we obtain these initial conditions does not matter. We could use preference shocks to capture the
interactions of demographics (retirement of given age cohorts) and state-level characteristics (weather, etc.). We could use
different prices dynamics (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011)).
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house price increases necessary to allow the model to reproduce the response of house prices to changes in
debt-to-income at the state level.
Table 4 reports that the model requires a 21% average increase in the collateral parameter, θ, and a
40% increase in the average house price, in order to match these two moments of the data. Note that
the increase in house prices is slightly smaller than in the data (40% vs. 45%). Since our calibration of
the dynamic parameters below relies on the model’s predictions for cross-sectional elasticities, we prefer a
parametrization that accounts for the cross-sectional elasticity of house price changes to changes in leverage
in the data, rather than the average change in house prices, though the discrepancy between the model and
the data is clearly negligible.
Table 4: Island Credit Boom
Data Model
Targets
∆ (B/Y ) 0.461 0.461
∆ log (Q) /∆ (B/Y ) 0.862 0.861
Parameters
average ∆ logQ 0.453 0.397
average ∆ log θ - 0.211
4.2 Calibration of dynamic parameters
The parameters θ, λ, φ are the key parameters in our model since they determine the economy’s response
to credit shocks. Intuitively, a higher θ implies that a higher fraction of nominal consumption spending is
financed out of private credit and is therefore sensitive to credit shocks. A higher degree of wage stickiness,
λ, implies a greater extent with which nominal shocks affect real activity. Finally, a greater degree of labor
market rigidities, as captured by φ, implies that it is costlier to reallocate labor from the non-tradable to the
tradable goods sector. Labor market rigidities amplify the island-specific shock by preventing islands from
accumulating public money.
4.2.1 Calibration of the steady-state collateral constraint, θ
To pin down the steady-state value of the collateral constraint, θ, we use micro evidence from Mian and
Sufi (2010a). Mian and Sufi (2010a) argue that borrowing against the value of home equity accounts for a
significant fraction of the rise in US household leverage from 2002 to 2006. They follow from 1997 to 2008
a random sample of 74,000 U.S. homeowners (who owned their homes as of 1997) in 2,300 zip codes located
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in 68 MSAs. As of 1997, median total debt is $100,000 of which $88,000 is home debt (home equity plus
mortgages), and the debt to income ratio is 2.5. Total debt grows by 8.6% between 1998 and 2002, and by
34.4% between 2002 and 2006. These changes are accounted for by home debt growth. The debt to income
ratio does not change from 1998 to 2002 and then increases by 0.75.
Mian and Sufi argue that there is a causal link from house price growth to borrowing. The critical issue is
that house price growth is endogenous. An omitted factor, such as expected income growth, could be driving
both house prices and current borrowing (and consumption). To identify a causal link they use instruments
for house price growth based on proxies for housing supply elasticities at the MSA level.
In their estimates, a $1 increase in house prices causes a $0.25 increase in home equity debt. Two issues
arise when we map this number into our model. The first issue is maturity. Our model assumes that debt
is repaid at the end of each year, while home lines of credit have an average maturity of 5 years. We show
in the appendix, using a simple model in which debt has a maturity of N years, households borrow every N
years (in a staggered fashion), and repay a fraction 1N of the debt each year, that the conversion factor from
the stock measure to the flow measure is N/2. This is intuitive, since if the initial amount of debt is equal
to B, then the average debt position of all households is equal to BN/2 . With an average maturity of 5 years,
$0.25 translates into $0.1 in our model with one-period debt.
The second issue has to do with the fact that θ changes over time in our model. To see this, note that
Mian and Sufi report that a $1 increase in house prices from 2001 to 2007 leads to a $0.25 increase in debt,
or:
B2007 −B2001 = 0.25 (Q2007 −Q2001)
If θ were constant, then, since in our model B = θQ we would have (ignoring the maturity adjustment)
θ = 0.25. We assume however, that θ changes over time, and that the increase in θ is perfectly correlated
with changes in house prices. Hence, the Mian-Sufi elasticity does not recover the steady-state collateral
constraint, θ2001 = θ . To recover this parameter, note that, according to our model B2007 − B2001 =
θ2007Q2007 − θ2001Q2001. Up to a first-order, we can thus write:
B2007 −B2001 ≈ (θ2007 − θ2001)
θ2001
θ2001Q2001 +
(Q2007 −Q2001)
Q2001
θ2001Q2001
Since, as shown in Table 4, we assume that θ increases by 1/2 as much as Q does (0.21 vs. 0.40), we have
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that
B2007 −B2001 ≈ 3
2
θ2001 (Q2007 −Q2001)
This implies that the Mian-Sufi elasticity is related to the steady-state collateral constraint θ by a factor of
about 3/2. Accounting for the two sources of bias, we have that θ¯equity = 0.25 ∗ 2/3 ∗ 2/5 = 0.067. Recall
also that in our model we allow for housing construction. Assuming a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 80% for
new mortgages, and noting that in the steady state the annual flow of spending on new homes is equal to
δh, we have that the collateral on mortgage debt is equal to θ¯mort = 0.8δh = .0288. The total amount of
debt (mortgage and home equity lines of credit) is thus bounded above by θ¯ = θ¯mort+ θ¯equity and is equal to
θ¯ = 0.0955. This number is quite reasonable a priori. Since 1 = Mx + θq, and since θq ≈ 0.2, the calibration
implies that about 20% of consumer spending is sensitive to real estate wealth. Alternatively, 20% of the
household consumption spending in our model is financed using debt (private money), and the rest using
public money.
4.2.2 Calibration of the degree of labor market rigidities, λ and φ
To pin down λ and φ, the parameters that govern the degree of real and nominal labor market frictions,
we require that the model accounts for the cross-sectional elasticities of changes in employment in the
construction and non-construction sectors during the bust (2007 to 2009) to the change in the debt-to-
income ratio, ∆B/Y during the boom (2001-2007), as in Figure 1. We compute these elasticities in the data
using the 12 states in Figure 1. Table 5 reports the moments in the model and in the data. We note that the
elasticity of changes in non-construction employment during the bust to changes in debt-to-income during
the boom is equal to -0.099 in the model and -0.098 in the data. Thus, the large decline in employment in
states that have experienced the largest booms is not accounted for by a decline in construction employment
alone. Though housing employment was a lot more sensitive to changes in debt (the elasticity is -0.59 in
the model and -0.52 in the data), the share of construction employment is fairly small so that declines in
non-construction employment account for the bulk, 70% (.098/.139) of the overall drop in employment in
the data. The last few rows of the table report several additional predictions of the model which we discuss
below.
We note that the model, not surprisingly since we use two parameters to fit these facts, does a good
job at reproducing the cross-sectional elasticities in the data. The implied parameter values are equal to
λ = 0.74 and φ = 4, suggesting a very large degree of wage stickiness (only a 26% fraction of the gap between
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the current and frictionless wage is covered each period) and very large costs of reallocating labor across
industries.
Table 5: Island Credit Crunch
Model Data
Targets (elasticities to debt-income)
total employment -0.137 -0.139
non-construction employment -0.108 -0.098
construction employment -0.548 -0.524
Additional Testable Predictions
Leverage -0.293 -0.248
Home Prices -0.860 -1.058
Consumption Spending -0.216 -0.243
Durable Consumption Spend. -0.683 -0.692
Non Durable Consumption Spend. -0.187 -0.174
Non Construction Wages -0.053 0.007
Construction Wages -0.641 -0.063
Figure (5) gives a sense of how the data identifies the parameters λ and φ. The lines are the prediction of
the model with the credit boom and bust simulated as in Table 4. Without wage rigidities (λ = 0), Figure
(5) shows that total employment barely moves in the cross section.
Figure 5: Identifying Wage Rigidities and Reallocation Costs from the Cross-Section.
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Lambda = 1%, 72% or 99%
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Phi = 1 or 4
Without sectoral reallocation costs (φ = 0), Figure (5) shows that labor moves too much across sectors.
A similar picture emerges if we use durable versus non durable employment.
Consider finally several additional predictions our model makes for the cross section. Figure 6 shows the
prediction of the model for the credit and housing markets, also reported in Table 5. The model does an
excellent job at reproducing these features of the data. In particular, the elasticity of house price changes in
31
the bust to the change in debt-to-income during the boom is equal to -1.06, thus only slightly higher than
the -0.86 in the data. This suggests that our assumption that house prices revert to their steady-state values
after the bust is in line with the data. Similarly, our model reproduces well the elasticity of the log-change
in debt-to-income, ∆ logB/Y in the bust to the change in debt-to-income ∆B/Y in the boom (-0.29 in the
model vs. -0.25 in the data), suggesting that our assumption that the collateral constraint returns to its
steady-state level is reasonable as well.
Our model also has implications regarding the cross-sectional response of consumption. Testing these
implications is difficult, however, since state-level consumption data is unavailable. For lack of a better
measure, we construct measures of consumption expenditures across states using the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX). The results are reported in Table 5 and in Figure 6. One should be careful in interpreting
these results since CEX was never designed to properly measure consumption across states and the state
identifier is in some cases coded with noise. For this reasons the cross sectional correlation of consumption
with changes in leverage is smaller than for the other variables in the Table. Nonetheless, the model predicts
elasticities that are consistent with the data. The elasticity of consumption spending to changes in debt-to-
income is equal to -0.21 in the model and -0.24, implying that consumption is 1.56 times more responsive
to credit shocks than employment (-0.214/-0.137) in the model, and 1.75 times in the data. Durable goods
spending is approximately three times more volatile than total consumption spending, both in the model
and in the data.
Notice finally that there is one dimension along which our model does not fit the data well, namely
the cross-sectional responses of construction wages (and to a lesser extent non-construction wages). In
particular, the model predicts that wages decline more than they do in the data. The elasticity is -5.3% in
the non-construction sectors compared to essentially zero in the data. This difference is economically small
and statistically insignificant. For construction, the model elasticity is -60% vs. -6.3% drop in the data.
Accounting for this large discrepancy would require unreasonable amounts of wage stickiness, and, more
importantly, would overstate the employment responses in the data. We also note that, irrespective of the
model’s prediction, the empirical fit of the cross sectional wage regression is poor. There appears to be a lot
of noise in wages that the model cannot replicate because it is essentially uncorrelated with the extent of
the credit boom and bust.
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Figure 6: Cross-Sectional Predictions for Home Prices, Deleveraging, and Consumption.
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5 Quantitative Aggregate Experiments
We next study the model’s aggregate implications. We first describe the experiment that replicates the
aggregate credit boom. The data sources we use to quantify the size of the aggregate credit boom are
slightly different from those used in the state-level analysis, hence there are some minor discrepancies from
what we have reported earlier. As in the island experiment, we generate a credit boom by matching key
moments of the data. We then let the model return to the initial value of θ¯ in a two-year period.
Table 6 reports the aggregate moments that we use to pin down the dynamics of qt and θt during the
boom and bust cycle. We ask the model to replicate the 49% increase in the debt-to-income ratio from 2001
to 2007, as well as the dynamics (an initial 20% increase and a subsequent 30% bust) of the ratio of home
values to consumption spending, q.We match these statistics by feeding the model a path for θt and housing
Euler equation wedges ωt that match these statistics exactly. As above, we model the bust as a gradual,
two-period long, equally-sized decline in θ from its value at the peak (2007) to the steady-state value. As
for ωt, we ask the model to reproduce the dynamics of qt in each of the years of the bust.
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Table 6: Aggregate Experiment
Data Model
d (B/Y ) from 2001 to 2007 0.49 0.49
q in 2001 2.11 2.11
q in 2007 2.53 2.53
q in 2008 2.05 2.05
q in 2009 1.85 1.85
When computing the responses of aggregate variables in these experiments, we entertain two sets of
assumptions about monetary policy. The first set of assumptions is meant to capture the observed path of
monetary policy and to deliver the model’s predictions that can be compared to the data. The second set
of assumptions provides counter-factual experiments.
In our first experiment, we allow the central bank to expand its balance sheet by 7% of GDP to capture the
first round of non standard monetary policies (see Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010),
Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010)). More precisely, we assume here a 7% expansion
(relative to the size of GDP) equally distributed across islands, and gradually implemented in 2008 and
2009. Table 7 reports the results of this expansion under alternative implementations. The first column
assumes an expansion of the stock of public money (M). The second column assumes that the central bank
lends directly to households (B).
Table 7 shows that the model predicts responses that are in line with the actual dynamics in the data.
Non-construction employment declines by almost as much as in the data (4.3% versus 5.3%), as does construc-
tion employment (20.2% vs. 20.7%). The model slightly overstates the decline in non-durable consumption
(a drop of 3.8% vs. 2.7%), and slightly understates the drop in durable consumption (13.1% vs. 13.8%), but
overall accounts for the response of consumption and employment remarkably well. In particular, our model
is consistent with the observation that durable-goods spending declined by much more than non-durable
spending.
Not surprisingly, since public and private money are substitutes in the model, the response of real variables
is independent of the exact source of the expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet. The only difference between
the M-expansion and the B-expansion is the implied change in debt to income, since the increase in monetary
aggregates is not counted as an increase in debt at the household level.
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Table 7: Aggregate Outcomes with Active Monetary Policy
QE of 7% of GDP
Change 2007-2009 Data with M with B
Non Construction Employment -0.053 -0.043 -0.043
Construction Employment -0.207 -0.202 -0.202
Non Durable Consumption -0.027 -0.038 -0.038
Durable Consumption -0.138 -0.131 -0.131
Debt/Income -0.043 -0.136 -0.006
Home Value/Income -0.260 -0.289 -0.289
Non Construction Wages -0.011 0.002 0.002
Construction Wages -0.007 -0.273 -0.273
In our second set of experiments, we ask: how would have the economy fared absent Fed intervention?
We answer this question in Table 8 by reporting the results of a counterfactual experiment in which the Fed
leaves its monetary aggregates unchanged at M = 1. The first column reports the evolution of aggregate
variables in our benchmark model economy, referred to as “Bench”. Absent the Fed’s intervention, our model
predicts a recession that is significantly worse than the one we have observed. For example, non-construction
employment would have declined by 8.7% instead of 5.3%. Non-durable consumption would have declined
by 7.3% instead of 2.7%. Durable consumption would have declined by 20.0% instead of 13.8%.
The other columns of Table 8 illustrate the role of the key parameters of the model that we have identified
using the cross-sectional data. In all of these experiments we continue to assume passive monetary policy
so that M = 1. When we set λ = 0, so that wages are flexible, we find that the model produces a much
milder recession. For example, non-construction employment declines by about 0.7% compared to 8.7% in
the Benchmark economy. The recession is mostly accounted for by the contraction in the construction sector,
combined with the frictions on labor mobility that we have assumed. When we set θ¯ = 0, credit shocks no
longer affect nominal consumption spending. The model once again produces a mild recession, again driven
by the contraction in the housing sector, associated with the decline in house prices.
Finally, when we set φ = 1, the model produces a contraction in the housing sector much more severe
than in the benchmark model (a 72% decline in employment compared to a 25% decline) or than in the data,
but the effect on total employment is muted by the fact that non-construction employment declines by less
(5.4% compared to 8.7%) than in the benchmark model. We also note that labor immobility amplifies a bit
the response of consumption: absent such frictions (i.e., when φ = 1), non-durable consumption declines by
only 4.2% (7.3% in the benchmark model), while non-durable consumption declines by about 15.5% (20%
in the benchmark model).
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Table 8: Counter-Factual Aggregate Outcomes
Model Predictions with M = 1
Change 2007-2009 Bench. λ = 0 θ¯ = 0 φ = 1
Non Construction Employment -0.087 -0.007 0.007 -0.054
Construction Employment -0.253 -0.081 -0.129 -0.718
Non Durable Consumption -0.073 -0.006 0.006 -0.042
Durable Consumption -0.199 -0.011 0.013 -0.155
Debt/Income -0.075 -0.080 -0.180 -0.066
Home Value/Income -0.279 -0.298 -0.279 -0.201
Non Construction Wages -0.036 -0.126 0.016 -0.032
Construction Wages -0.324 -0.420 -0.224 -0.032
We thus conclude that the parameters λ and θ play a crucial role in determining the response of our
model economy to credit shocks. This reinforces the need to identify such parameters using a richer set of
cross-sectional moments, rather than relying solely on aggregate statistics. The latter reflect the stance of
monetary and fiscal policy, international capital flows, as well as other real shocks, and use of the aggregate
data alone precludes a sharp identification of the key frictions in the model.
To summarize, we find that the Fed intervention can have important consequences for the severity of
the recession in our setup. The model predicts that absent the monetary intervention, the drop in non-
construction employment would have been about 65% larger, while the drop in non-durable consumption
would have been 2.7 times larger and that in durable-goods spending would have been about 65% larger.
Of course, in our simple model, a monetary expansion of the right magnitude could completely offset the
effect of the decline in household borrowing. An interesting extension of our analysis would consider a more
realistic description of monetary policy and the constraints that have prevented the Fed from expanding the
supply of public money. We relegate such an extension to future work.
6 Extension: A Model with Credit
In this section we extend our analysis to allow households to save and borrow inter-temporally using a risk-
free asset. The purpose of this extension is two-fold. First, we argue that our results in the parsimonious
setup considered earlier are robust to allowing inter-temporal borrowing and saving. Second, we can study
separately the effects of shocks to the liquidity constraint and shocks to the credit constraint. Distinguishing
between the two types of constraints is important in light of work by Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and Mc-
Clelland (2011) and Kaplan and Violante (2011) who document empirically that a large fraction of wealthy
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households – households who are net savers – are nonetheless liquidity constrained.
6.1 Setup
Modeling separately credit and liquidity requires some modification to our benchmark model. Each island is
inhabited by two types of households, indexed by z ∈ {p,m}, where p stands for patient and m for impatient.
Let czt (i) denote the consumption of household of type z on island i and use a similar notation for the other
island-type-specific allocations. We assume that agents differ in their discount factors, with βp > βm. An
agent of type z on island i maximizes
∞∑
t=0
βtzu (c
z
t (i) , l
z
t (i) , h
z
t (i)) (26)
We assume that the goods markets and the asset markets are physically segmented: although funds can
be transferred from one market to another with a one-period delay, no such transfers are allowed within a
period. We consider separately the two markets.
Consider first the goods market. As earlier, a household’s purchases in the goods market are subject
to a cash-credit-in-advance (CCIA) constraint. In addition to currency, Mzt (i), the household can obtain
liquidity by borrowing Bzt (i) units against its home equity. Let θb denote the fraction of house value up to
which the household can borrow. We have:
Bzt (i) ≤ θbQt (i)hzt (i) , (27)
where Qt (i) is the price of houses on the island and hzt (i) is the stock of houses owned by the household at
the end of period t. We assume home equity borrowing takes the form of one-period risk-free debt that must
be repaid at a nominal interest Rt in the following period. We refer to the home equity borrowing constraint
(27) as a liquidity constraint.
The household’s CCiA constraint is as earlier, given by Pt (i) czt (i) +Qt (i)
(
hzt (i)− hzt−1 (i)
) ≤Mzt (i) +
Bzt (i) . Consider next the asset market. In addition to money holdings, the household can now save (or
borrow) by trading one-period risk-free securities in the asset market. Let Azt (i) be the agent’s position
in the asset market at the end of period t: a positive position indicates that the household is a lender, a
negative position indicates that the household is a borrower. The amount the household can borrow in the
asset market is constrained as well: the household can only borrow up to a fraction θa of the value of its
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home:
−Azt (i) ≤ θaQt (i)hzt (i)
As with the home equity borrowing, borrowing in the asset market must be repaid at a nominal interest rate
Rt in the following period.
Consider next how the agents’ balances in the two markets evolve over time. Every period, the household
can transfer funds from the asset market to the goods market. Let Xzt (i) denote the size of the transfer.
The evolution of the household’s currency holdings is:
Mzt+1 (i) = M
z
t (i)+B
z
t (i)−Pt (i) czt (i)−Qt (i) (hzt (i)−hzt−1 (i))− (1 +Rt−1)Bzt−1 (i)+Wt (i) lzt (i)+Xzt (i)
This law of motion differs from the one studied in the previous section along two dimensions. First, the
household must pay interest Rt−1Bzt−1 (i) on home equity borrowing. Second, the household can augment
its holdings of currency by transferring funds from the asset market. Notice that a transfer at date t is only
available for consumption at period t+ 1, thus with a one period delay.
The household’s position in the asset market evolves according to:
Azt (i) = (1 +Rt−1)A
z
t−1 (i)−Xzt (i)
This says that the household’s position at the end of period t is equal to its beginning-of-period balances
(which include interest payments on the loans it made in the previous period) net of the transfers it makes
to the goods market.
To summarize, the household’s problem is to choose czt (i) , lzt (i), hzt (i), Azt+1 (i) , Mzt+1 (i), Bzt (i) to
maximize (26). The rest of the model is identical to the benchmark model described earlier. Equilibrium in
the aggregate credit market requires that the sum of all loans made in the asset market is equal to the sum
of all home equity lines of credit:
ˆ
Amt (i) di +
ˆ
Apt (i) di =
ˆ
Bmt (i) di +
ˆ
Bpt (i) di (28)
One way to interpret this equilibrium condition is that competitive financial intermediaries borrow from
households in the asset market and lend to households both in the asset market and in the goods market,
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the latter via home equity lines of credit. The key implicit assumption that underlines equation (28) is that
financial intermediaries can partly sidestep the asset market frictions that household face and transfer funds
from one market to another without a one-period delay. Their ability to do so is limited however by the
liquidity constraint (27). The rest of the equilibrium conditions are straightforward. In the money market
we have: ˆ
Mpt (i) di+
ˆ
Mmt (i) di = M¯
Equilibrium in the labor market for each island i requires that lpt (i) + lmt (i) = lt (i) = lτ (i) + ln (i). Final
goods consumption is cmt (i) + c
p
t (i) = ct (i). The specification of preferences and technology is otherwise
identical in this setup as in the benchmark setup studied in the previous sections.
6.2 Decision Rules
To understand the workings on the model, it is useful to briefly describe the agents’ decision rules for how
much balances to hold in each market. Let λzt (i) be an agent’s marginal valuation of its holdings in the asset
market and γzt (i) denote the multiplier on the CCIA constraint. Moreover, let ξzt (i) denote the multiplier
on the credit constraint and µzt (i) denote the multiplier on the liquidity constraint. These objects satisfy:
λzt (i) = βz (1 +Rt)Etλ
z
t+1 (i) + ξ
z
t (i)
λzt (i) + γ
z
t (i) = βz (1 +Rt)Etλ
z
t+1 (i) + µ
z
t (i)
uzc,t (i)
Pt (i)
= λzt (i) + γ
z
t (i)
γzt (i) =
uzc,t (i)
Pt
− βzEt
uzc,t+1 (i)
Pt+1 (i)
To understand these expressions, note that λzt (i) +γzt (i) is the marginal value of one unit of currency in the
goods market, while λzt (i) is the marginal value of one unit of balances in the asset market. Since it takes
one period to transfer funds from the asset market to the goods market, γzt (i) is the shadow valuation of
liquidity. Subtracting the second expression from the first yields
γzt (i) + ξ
z
t (i) = µ
z
t (i)
39
Clearly, if the household is unconstrained in the asset market (ξzt (i) = 0) , then the shadow value of liquidity,
γzt (i) is simply equal to the multiplier on the home equity constraint, µzt (i) . Similarly, absent an upper bound
on home equity borrowing, we have µzt (i) = 0 and hence the CCIA constraint does not bind.
Consider next the size of these multipliers in a symmetric steady state. Clearly, the patient household is
not constrained in the asset market, so that the nominal interest rate simply reflects the patient household’s
rate of time preference:
R =
1
βp
− 1
Even though patient households are not credit-constrained, they are liquidity constrained. To see this,
note that these agents’ shadow valuation of liquidity is equal to γp (i) = (1− βp)u
p
c
P > 0. Finally, impatient
household are both credit and liquidity constrained. As with patient households, the severity of their liquidity
constraint is determined by the gap between 1 and βm, since γm (i) = (1− βm)u
m
c
P > 0. In contrast, the
severity of their credit constraint is determined by the gap between the two agents’ rates of time preference,
since ξm (i) =
(
1− βmβp
)
λm (i).
In this economy, the asset holdings of agents on individual islands are non-stationary, as in the small open
economy incomplete markets literature. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and Neumeyer and Perri
(2005), we eliminate this non-stationarity by assuming that patient agents on each island face a quadratic
cost of deviating from the aggregate asset market position. These details are discussed in the appendix,
together with the calibration. We assign the same parameters to this model as to the original model, and
choose θa and θb to match the Mian-Sufi evidence on the marginal propensity to consume out of housing
wealth and the average loan-to-value ratio of mortgages in the U.S. data.
6.3 Quantitative Experiments
We next study the economy’s responses to liquidity and credit shocks and also compare the responses to
liquidity shocks in this setup with those in the benchmark setup without credit studied in the previous
section. To facilitate comparison, we strip down both models of some the elements we have assumed earlier:
the housing production sector–housing now is in fixed supply, durable goods consumption, and sectoral labor
adjustment costs.
We study separately the responses to a permanent, one-time, unanticipated decrease in each of the
collateral constraints, θb and θa, at both the island and aggregate level. We also contrast the response to
liquidity shocks, i.e. shocks to θb, in the economies with and without credit.
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Consider first the response to a liquidity shock in the benchmark model and in the model with credit.
We choose the size of the shocks in the two models so that in both models aggregate nominal consumption
expenditure declines on impact by 10%. We then feed through the same shock to an individual island in order
to study the island responses. When reporting the island-level responses, we study two separate versions of
the model with credit. In the first version the portfolio adjustment cost is infinitesimally small so that it
does not affect the model’s impulse responses in the first few years after the shock, only the very long-run
responses. In the second version we increase the portfolio adjustment cost so as to increase the degree of
asset market segmentation and prevent patient households from transferring funds from the asset market to
the goods market.
Figure 7 reports impulse responses to an aggregate liquidity shock. Clearly, the responses in our bench-
mark model and the model with credit are identical. Since the liquidity shock is permanent, nominal spending
permanently declines by 10% in both models. The dynamics of real variables are then solely determined by
the degree of price rigidities, as captured by the common parameter λ.
Figure 7: Responses to Aggregate Liquidity Shocks
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Figure 8 reports impulse responses to an island-level liquidity shock in the models with credit and in the
benchmark model. Consider first the credit model without portfolio adjustment costs. Notice that, unlike
in the benchmark model, nominal spending declines for only one period and then almost fully returns to the
new steady state. The reason for the sharp increase in nominal spending after a period is that patient agents
transfer balances from the asset market to the goods market. They use these balances to buy consumption
goods, as well as to purchases houses from impatient households. They do so because house prices declines
sharply after a liquidity shock (by about 15%) and overshoot their long-run response (which is about 5%
lower than the initial steady state). The island’s nominal spending thus recovers in essentially one period, as
both patient and impatient households are both to increase the amount of currency used for consumption.
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The quick recovery in nominal spending implies in turn that real allocations return to essentially their initial
values with a one period delay.
Consider next the credit model with portfolio adjustment costs. Such costs restrict in their ability to
transfer funds from the asset market to the goods market. As a result the recovery in nominal spending is
much slower and the effects on consumption and employment somewhat more persistent. We note however
that both the model with and without adjustment costs have broadly similar implications for the responses
of employment and consumption as our benchmark model. All models predict a sharp initial drop in real
activity and a quick recovery as the island accumulates public money. We thus conclude that our quantitative
results in the previous section are robust to allowing for inter-temporal borrowing and lending.
Figure 8: Responses to Island Liquidity Shocks
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Finally, we consider the model’s responses to a credit shock, reported in Figure 9. The size of the shock
is equal to the liquidity shocks studied above. Notice that the decline in employment and consumption,
both in the aggregate and at the island-level, are about 1/100th the size of these declines in response to
liquidity shocks. The reason this decline is small is because credit shocks only affect the constrained agents.
Although these agents’ nominal balances decline somewhat, the effect of this shock on island and aggregate
responses is offset by the fact that unconstrained agents now consume somewhat more and by the fact that
impatient agents sell their housing stock and thus smooth out their consumption path. Overall, since credit
shocks affect only one subset of households, they wash out in the aggregate and have a negligible effect on
real activity.
Comparison with Other Work
Our findings that credit shocks have a small effect on real activity differs from the results of Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2010) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2011). For aggregate responses, the main reason is that we
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Figure 9: Responses to Credit Shocks
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study the responses of the economy away from the zero lower bound on interest rates while Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2010) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2011) focus on the liquidity trap. (In our setup the nominal
interest changes very little, by only 5 basis points, after a liquidity shock of the size studied above since
impatient households can delever by selling part of their housing stock to patient households). Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2010) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2011) study only aggregate responses. In the cross-section
the zero lower bound is less relevant because islands can borrow and lend at the same interest rate.
Another difference with Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2010) is that they study a Bewley economy in which
a precautionary savings motive leads both constrained as well as some unconstrained households to reduce
consumption. Credit shocks have large distributional effects: average labor productivity drops as rich and
productive agents cut back on their labor supply. The impact on aggregate employment is ambiguous, but
in the benchmark calibration of Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2010), employment goes up when the zero lower
bound does not bind.
We thus think of our paper as complementary to those of Eggertsson and Krugman (2011) and Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2010) in that we focus on another mechanism–liquidity constraints– that implies sizable real
effects from household de-leveraging, and that we emphasize the importance of cross-sectional responses.
7 Conclusion
We have studied a cash-in-advance economy in which home equity borrowing, together with public money,
is used to conduct transactions. We calibrate the model to account for the evidence on the dynamics of
credit and employment in a cross-section of U.S. states and argue that a model capable of matching the
cross-sectional facts implies strong sensitivity of real activity to credit shocks. We interpret these results
43
as suggesting that a sharp reduction in credit at the household level accounts to a non-negligible extent for
the collapse of output and employment in the recent recession. Expansionary monetary policy can, in this
framework, significantly reduce the severity of a recession.
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Appendix
Data
State level population, employment, earnings by place of work, and compensation (by industry) are from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, Regional Economic Accounts). For wages, we divide compensation
by wage & salary employment. Home prices are from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). State
level household debt comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It includes Consumer Credit and
Mortgage Debt. State level consumption is constructed from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
BEA, Income and Employment by State
1. Earnings by Place of Work, $ million. By state of work.
2. Compensation (all industries), $ million. By state of work. Wages + Employer Contributions
3. Wages (all industries), $ million. By state of work.
4. Compensation (construction), $ million. By state of work. Wages + Employer Contributions. NAICS
classification.
5. Wages (construction), $ million. By state of work.
6. Total employment (all industries). Persons.
7. Wage employment (all industries). Persons.
8. Total employment (construction). Persons. NAICS classification.
9. Wage employment (construction). Persons. NAICS classification.
NY FED
1. Total Debt, Q1, not seasonally adjusted.
2. Total Debt, Q4, not seasonally adjusted.
3. Total Debt, Average over the year, not seasonally adjusted.
All data in $ million. Total Debt includes mortgage accounts, home equity revolving accounts, auto loans,
bank card accounts, student loans and other loans. Excludes population without a social security number.
FHFA
1. House Prices in Q1
2. House Prices in Q4
3. Average House Prices in a year
House prices are based on sales price data. Index (100 in 2001, Q1). The annual average for 2010 is the
average of Q1-Q3.
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Consumers’ First Order Conditions
The first-order conditions for money holdings, consumption, labor, and housing and non-durables are:
uc¯,it
P¯i,t
= β (1 + r)Et
uc¯,it+1
P¯i,t+1
+ µi,t,
−ulk,it
W ki,t
= βEt
uc¯,it+1
P¯i,t+1
for k = n, τ, h,
uh,it + µi,tθi,tQi,t =
Qi,t
P¯i,t
uc¯,it − β(1− δh)EtQi,t+1
P¯i,t+1
uc¯,it+1,
ud¯,it =
V¯i,t
P¯i,t
uc¯,it − β(1− δd)Et V¯i,t+1
P¯i,t+1
uc¯,it+1,
where µi,t is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
The Simplified Model
Nominal wage setting is given by (5), and labor market clearing in each island implies li,t = lni,t + lτi,t. Using
xi,t, we can rewrite the labor supply (6) as
(
lni,t + l
τ
i,t
) 1
ν = W ∗i,tβEt
[
x−1i,t+1
]
. (29)
Trade and technology pin down labor demands. For local goods, we have lni,t = cni,t, which we can rewrite as
lni,t = (1− ω)
xi,tW
−σ
i,t
P¯ 1−σi,t
. (30)
For traded goods, we have lτi,t =
´
j
cτj,t(i)dj which we can rewrite as
lτi,t = ωW
−γ
i,t
(
P¯ τt
)γ−σ ˆ
j
xj,t
P¯ 1−σj,t
(31)
The price indexes are such that
(
P¯i,t
)1−σ
= ω
(
P¯ τt
)1−σ
+ (1− ω) (Wi,t)1−σ (32)
and (
P¯ τt
)1−γ
=
ˆ
j
(Wj,t)
1−γ (33)
In this simplified system, we now have nine equations (5, 20, 21, 22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33) and nine unknowns{
qi,t, xi,t,Mi,t, l
n
i,t, l
τ
i,t,Wi,t,W
∗
i,t, P¯i,t, P¯
τ
t
}
.
48
Aggregate Equations
Consider the dynamics of credit first. Given processes {Mt}t and {θt}t, the system can be solved for {xt, qt}t
using (21) and (22). When θ = 0, the solution is always xt = Mt as in the standard cash-in-advance model.
When θ > 0, house price or collateral shocks to are transmitted by the collateral constraint. In the one island
economy, we have Wt = P¯t and the equations for the price levels are trivial. We also have c¯t = lt. Once
we have solved for xt and qt we can therefore solve for Wt and lt by using Wtlt = xt, Wt = Wλt−1 (W ∗t )
1−λ,
and (lt)
1
ν = βW ∗t Et
[
x−1t+1
]
. Note that the labor shares are constant in the one island economy: since
lnt = (1− ω) xtPt and lτt = ω xtPt , we always have
lnt
lnt +l
τ
t
= 1− ω.
Consider next the impact of a permanent, unanticipated shock to θ. When M and θ are constant, we
have q (θ) = η(1−β)(1−θ) and x (θ) =
M
1−θq . Following a permanent shock, x is constant and since Wtlt = x
and employment is
ln (lt) =
λν
1− λ+ ν (ln (x)− ln (Wt−1)) +
(1− λ) ν
1− λ+ ν ln (β) ,
while W satisfies
(1− λ+ ν) lnWt = λν lnWt−1 + (1− λ) ((1 + ν) log x− ν log β) .
Without nominal rigidities (i.e., λ = 0) wages adjust immediately to nominal credit shocks and employment
remains constant.14 The persistence of the real effects following a permanent credit shock is given by λν1−λ+ν .
Persistence thus depends on the degree of nominal rigidity and on the elasticity of labor supply. If wages
are fixed (i.e., λ = 1) the real impact of aggregate nominal credit shocks is permanent. We will show that
this result does not hold in the cross-section.
Island Equations
To study the responses to such a shock, we find it useful to study log-linear approximations to the equilibrium
conditions. For any variable zit we write zi,t = z¯ (1 + zˆt + zˆit), where zˆt is the solution to the one-island log-
linear model, and the total log-change is d ln zi,t = zˆt + zˆit. We note that, up to a first-order approximation,
the evolution of the aggregates in our model with heterogeneous islands is equivalent to the evolution of
the one-island economy. Hence, we first characterize the one-island (aggregate) responses and then compute
log-deviations of each island from the aggregate responses. From now on, we use the term “one-island” and
“aggregate” interchangeably.
Consider first the island-level response of trade and labor demand. In the aggregate, we have that
Pt = Wt. Around these aggregate dynamics, we have lˆni,t = xˆi,t − σWˆi,t − (1− σ) ˆ¯Pi,t, ˆ¯Pi,t = (1− ω) Wˆi,t,
and lˆτi,t = −γWˆi,t. We therefore have that lˆni,t = xˆi,t− (1− ω (1− σ)) Wˆi,t. Since lˆi,t = (1− ω) lˆni,t +ωlˆτi,t, we
obtain
lˆi,t = (1− ω) xˆi,t − (ωγ + (1− ω) (1− ω (1− σ))) Wˆi,t. (34)
This equation links island-level employment to island-level nominal spending on non tradable goods and
island-specific wages. Compared to the aggregate economy, employment is less sensitive to (local) spending.
The wage elasticity of labor demand depends on both elasticities γ and σ, and on the importance of traded
goods ω.
Consider next the island-level responses of labor supply and the dynamics of wages: Wˆi,t = λWˆi,t−1 +
(1− λ) Wˆ ∗i,t, and lˆi,t = ν
(
Wˆ ∗i,t − Et [xˆi,t+1]
)
. Solving for the desired wage, we obtain an equation that
14When λ = 0, we have (lt)
1+ν
ν = βEt
[
xt
xt+1
]
so transitory shocks would still matter. This reflects the inter-temporal
distortion coming from the CIA constraint. The model without nominal friction is neutral with respect to permanent nominal
credit shocks. It is not super-neutral because θ is not constant, then xmoves around, and this creates inter-temporal disturbances
in labor supply but these distortions are small.
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describes wages dynamics as a function of total spending:
(1− λ)
(
lˆi,t + νEt [xˆi,t+1]
)
= ν
(
Wˆi,t − λWˆi,t−1
)
. (35)
Equation (35) is relevant only when λ < 1. When λ = 1, wages are fixed at their steady-state values.
The third and last part of the system describes credit dynamics. In the aggregate, we have xt = Wtlt.
At the island level, we have:
(
1− θ¯q¯) xˆi,t − θ¯q¯qˆi,t = Wˆi,t−1 + lˆi,t−1 − θ¯q¯ (qˆi,t−1 + xˆi,t−1) + θ¯q¯ (θˆi,t − θˆi,t−1) , (36)
and
βEt
[
qˆi,t+1 + θ¯xˆi,t+1
]
=
(
1− (1− β) θ¯) qˆi,t + θ¯βxˆi,t − (1− β) θ¯θˆi,t. (37)
We therefore have a system of four equations (34, 35, 36, 37) in four endogenous unknowns (Wˆi,t, lˆi,t, xˆi,t, qˆi,t)
and one exogenous processes for θi,t. We calibrate and solve the system numerically in Section 3, but much
intuition can be gained by considering the special case of fixed wages.
We consider permanent shocks to θi,t so after the initial shock θi,0 at t = 0, we have θˆi,t = θˆi,t−1 for
t = 1, ...,∞ and the credit system (36,37) is simplified. We also assume that relative wages do not change:
Wˆi,t = 0.15 With constant relative wages we have lˆi,t = (1− ω) xˆi,t, and the money accumulation equation
(36) becomes: (
1− θ¯q¯) xˆi,t − θ¯q¯qˆi,t = (1− ω − θ¯q¯) xˆi,t−1 − θ¯q¯qˆi,t−1.
We ‘guess and verify’ a solution of the type:
qˆi,t = q˜i − axˆi,t. (38)
In the cross sectional steady state, we have qi = η(1−β)(1−θi) so it is easy to guess that there must be a time
invariant component to q. The money accumulation equation implies
xˆi,t =
(
1− ω
1− θ¯q¯ (1− a)
)
xˆi,t−1. (39)
In the special case ω = 0, we go back to the one island economy with constant x. The house pricing equation
becomes
β
(
θ¯ − a)Et [xˆi,t+1] + βq˜i = (1− (1− β) θ¯) (q˜i − axˆi,t) + θ¯βxˆi,t − (1− β) θ¯θˆi
We can now identify the constant terms and the dynamic terms. For the constant term we get q˜i = θ¯1−θ¯ θˆi.
This is what we expected since the long run value for qˆi implies d log qi = −d log (1− θi) = θ¯1−θ¯ θˆi. For the
dynamic terms we get
Et [xˆit+1] =
(
1− a (1− β)
(
1− θ¯)
β
(
θ¯ − a)
)
xˆit
15This could be either because wages are rigid in nominal terms, λ = 1, or because relative wages are fixed across islands. In
the first case, we can drop equation (35). In the second case, we are simply saying Wit = Wt in all islands. Empirically, this
appears to be a reasonable approximation to the data. Theoretically, we know that Wit = Wt in the long run. See below for a
discussion of what happens if relative wages move.
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Under perfect foresight and using the law of motion (39), we obtain an equation for a:
ω
(
θ¯ − a)β = a (1− β) (1− θ¯) (1− θ¯q¯ (1− a)) (40)
We can find a solution for a, which validates our initial guess in equation (38). If ω = 0, we have a = 0 as
in the one-island economy. When ω > 0, the LHS of (40) decreases and reaches zero when a = θ¯, while the
RHS is zero when a = 0 and increases afterward. There is therefore a unique solution 0 < a < θ¯. Equation
(39) shows that the system is stable and limt→∞ xˆit = 0.
The impact response, assuming we start from steady state with θˆi,t−1 = 0, is
(
1− θ¯q¯) xˆi,0− θ¯q¯qˆi,0 = θ¯q¯θˆi
and since qˆi,0 = q˜i − axˆi,0 we have
(
1− (1− a) θ¯q¯) xˆi,0 = q¯
1− θ¯ θ¯θˆi.
A positive shock to credit increases spending in the island.
Finally we can come back to our assumption of constant wages. If relative wages can move, they will
help smooth the transition by making hard hit islands temporarily more competitive. Without this we force
all the adjustment through consumption and nominal spending. But the main intuition should not change
much. We can see which way wages want to adjust by looking at equation (35). Since lˆi,t = (1− ω) xˆi,t
and since xi,t follows an AR(1) process, wages would like to follow an AR(2) process. We thus expect the
response of wages to be hump-shaped. Following a negative shock, relative wages fall first, then rise back to
one, the long run value. As long as labor supply is somewhat elastic, the response of wages is small, and the
dynamics derived under the assumption of fixed wages give a good approximation.
Proofs of Proposition 3
The simplest way to understand the optimal plan is to solve for the plan without CiA constraints, and then
to show it can be implemented with the right taxes. Consider for simplicity, a linear technology for home
construction. Without CiA, the Lagrangian of the Planner’s program is
L = E
∑
βt {u (ct, ht, lt) + λt (lt − ct − ht + (1− δh)ht−1)} .
The optimal labor supply requires uc (t) + ul (t) = 0 and the optimal housing investment requires
uh (t) = uc (t)− β (1− δh)Et [uc (t+ 1)] .
We can compare with the decentralized equilibrium with taxes and constant prices. Let τ l be the tax on
labor income and τh be the tax on home construction. Optimal labor supply requires
(
1− τ l)β = 1. As
expected, the planner would choose a negative labor income tax to correct the inter-temporal distortion.
The steady state housing equation of the Planner’s program is hc =
η
1−β(1−δh) while in the decentralized we
have hc =
(
1− τh) q and q = η1−β(1−δh)−θ(1−β) . So optimality requires
τh =
θ (1− β)
1− β (1− δh) .
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Credit and Home Price Dynamics with News
In this section we briefly explain how anticipated changes in θ affect current home prices and credit. This is
important to account for the relative volatility of credit and home prices.
Unexpected Shocks (benchmark model)
This is what we have been doing to far. Imagine that we start from a steady state with θ = θ0, q0 =
η
(1−β)(1−θ0) and x0 =
1
1−θ0q0 . The time line of events is:
• t = 0. Steady state with θ0
• t ≥ 1. Permanent shock realized, θt = θ1 remains constant.
For small values of θ, in steady state, we have xt ≈ 1 + θtqt and qt ≈ η1−β (1 + θt). Start from q0 = 2 and
θ0 = 0 so η1−β = 2 while x0 = 1. Consider a small change in θ, then qt ≈ 2 (1 + θt) and qˆt = qt−q0q0 ≈ θt so
that xt ≈ 1 + 2θt and xˆt = xt−x0x0 ≈ 2θt. House prices are
Qt = qtxt
Hence
Qˆ1 = qˆ1 + xˆ1 =
3
2
xˆ
Say we want x to move up by 10% in our calibration this implies that Q moves up by 15%. In this model,
house prices cannot move up more than 1.5 times nominal spending. So spending should move by at least
2/3 of house price appreciation. In the cross section, however, spending moves by 0.14 to 0.18 times the log
change in house prices. This suggests we need “anticipated” shocks as well.
Expected Shock (news model)
Now we had a “news shock”:
• t = 0. Steady state with θ0
• t = 1. News that {θt} will permanently jump to θ2 > θ0 at time 2. We still have θ1 = θ0, but {qt}
jumps to q1 > q0, and therefore x will also jump.
• t ≥ 2. Permanent shock realized, θt = θ2 remains constant.
It is easy to see that from t = 2 onwards, we are back to steady state with q2 = η(1−β)(1−θ2) and x2 =
1
1−θ2q2 . What is more interesting is what happens at time 1. We have x1 =
1
1−θ0q1 and η + βq2 =(
1− θ0
(
1− β x1x2
))
q1. So we can solve for q1 exactly using
η + βq2 =
(
1− θ0
(
1− β 1− θ2q2
1− θ0q1
))
q1
For small θ, we have x1 ≈ 1 + θ0q1 and q1 ≈ η+βq21−θ0(1−β) . We cannot literally start from θ0 = 0 because we
would need infinite q1 to move x1. Since x0 ≈ 1 + θ0q0, we have xˆ1 ≈ θ0(q1−q0)1+θ0q0 =
q0θ0
1+θ0q0
qˆ1. With our usual
calibration of q0 = 2 and θ0 = 5%, we get xˆ1 = 111 qˆ1. Now we get Qˆ1 = qˆ1 + xˆ1 = 12xˆ1. If x moves up by
10%, house prices move up by 120%.
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Calibrating θ
What is the right value for θ given the Mian-Sufi estimates? We need to map a “5 year” regression estimate
into an annual model, taking into account the maturity of HELOCs and the sources of the shock. The
Mian-Sufi result says:
BT −B1 = 0.25 (QT −Q1)
First issue: the source of shock
In our model, normalizing h = 1, we have B = θQ so
BT −B1 = θTQT − θ1Q1 ≈ (θT − θ1)Q1 + (QT −Q1) θ1
In the news model, have θT = θ1 so we can indeed use the Mian-Sufi estimate of 0.25 to calibrate θ1.
If the shock is a move in current θ, it is not so clear. With current shocks only, we have shown that
QT−Q1
Q1
≈ 3 (θT − θ1) so BT − B1 ≈ QT−Q13Q1 Q1 + (QT −Q1) θ1 and ∆B =
(
θ1 +
1
3
)
∆Q. Thus it is not
possible to have a coefficient of 0.25 in this case. It must be at least 0.33. But suppose we think that the
current shock has moved by some amount θT − θ1. The rest is anticipated shocks. The anticipated shocks
move house prices. If we assume that anticipated shocks are proportional to realized current ones, then
house price movements will be proportional to shocks:
θT − θ1
θ1
= m
QT −Q1
Q1
which implies for debt
BT −B1 ≈ (θT − θ1)Q1 + (QT −Q1) θ1 = (QT −Q1) θ1 (1 +m)
So the bias is m. Note that the pure news model has effectively m = 0 since it imposes θT − θ1 = 0. Now
we can get a sense of how large m is by looking at macro data. If we write θT = (1 + g) θ1. The macro data
suggests g ≈ 0.2 since debt went up by 20% more than house value (in aggregate 50% versus 40%). Then
we have g = mQT−Q1Q1 . Since house value went up 40%, we get m = 0.5, which implies that θ1 = 2/3 ∗ 0.25
Second issue: maturity
Imagine the following economy. There are N households. Household 1 borrow B at the beginning of time
1, and spends it immediately. Then it repays B/N at the end of time 1, 2..N . Then at time N + 1, it
starts the same cycle. Household 2 does it at 2 and N + 2 and so on. This economy is stationary and
the maturity of debt is 5 years (note that we abstract from interest rates for simplicity, as in our model).
Moreover, in any period, the beginning of period spending is B (by the one household who just took out
the loan). The total repayment at the end of the period is N × B/N = B. So this matches exactly
our model in terms of flows. But the outstanding balances are: (i) Beginning of period outstanding debt:
B +B
(
1− 1N
)
+B
(
1− 2N
)
. . .+ BN = NB − N(N−1)2 B = N+12 B ; (ii) End of period is beginning of period
minus B: N−12 B
So the average balance during the period is exactly NB2 . Our θ relates to spending within the period,
which is B. If we measure θ as Mian-Sufi, we get an upward bias of N/2. Since average maturity is 5 years
for HELOC, the bias is 2.5. If we take the “news” model, we want to calibrate θ by scaling it down from
0.25 to 0.1. If we take the mixed model, we obtain our “structural” estimate of θ1 as
θ1 = 0.25/2.5 ∗ 2/3 = 0.067.
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Model with Credit
Stationarity
In this economy, the asset holdings of agents on individual islands are non-stationary, as in the small open
economy incomplete markets literature. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and Neumeyer and Perri
(2005), we eliminate this non-stationarity by assuming that patient agents on each island face a quadratic
cost of deviating from the aggregate asset market position. This cost is a fee rebated lump-sum to patient
agents. The patient household’s budget constraint becomes
∆Mpt+1 (i) = B
p
t (i)−Pt (i) cpt (i)−Qt (i) ∆hpt (i)−(1 +Rt−1)Bpt−1 (i)+Wt (i) lpt (i)+Xpt (i)−
ξ
2
(Apt (i)−Apt )2+Tt (i)
where Tt (i) are the lump-sum transfers and A
p
t =
´
Apt (i) di are the aggregate asset holdings of the patient
agents.
Calibration
We set identical technology parameters in the two models. As earlier, we choose an elasticity of substitution
across different tradables of γ = 1.5, a tradable-non-tradable elasticity of σ = 0.1, and a labor supply
elasticity of ν = 2. The preference weight on tradables is equal to ω = 0.25. We set the degree of wage
stickiness equal to λ = 0.7. In the benchmark model we choose the preference weight on housing, η so as to
ensure a housing to consumption ratio of 2.1, and we set the discount factor equal to β = 0.95. Finally, as
we described earlier, we set the liquidity constraint parameter equal to θ = 0.067.
For the model with credit, we set the discount factor of the two types equal to βm = 0.92 and βp = 0.98,
respectively. We again choose the preference weight on housing, η, to ensure an aggregate housing to
consumption ratio of 2.1. Given the heterogeneity in preferences, in equilibrium agents differ in their housing-
to-consumption ratio: while patient agent’s housing stock is about 3 times greater than their consumption,
impatient agent’s stock is only about 1 times their consumption.
To calibrate the credit and liquidity constraints in the model with credit, we choose θa and θb to jointly
target two statistics. First, as in the previous model and in the Mian and Sufi (2010a) evidence, we target
a marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth of 0.067. In the model with credit households can
consume by borrowing in both the asset and credit market. Hence the marginal propensity to consume out
of housing wealth is equal to
mpc =
(
θa + θb
)
hm + θbhp
hm + hp
= 0.067
Second, standard mortgages have a combined loan-to-value ratio of about 80% and a 15-year total maturity,
that is, a 7 = (15− 1) /2 average maturity. Translating the 7-year maturity into our one-period loan in the
model implies a loan-to-value ratio equal to 0.8/7 = 0.11. Hence, our second target is:
θa + θb = 0.11
These two targets imply that θa = 0.056 and θb = 0.054, thus not too different then in the benchmark model.
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